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ABSTRACT 
This research argues that in order to operate successfully a Natural Resource Fund 
(NRF), no matter what its goals are, must be transparent, accountable and open for public 
scrutiny. Otherwise, a NRF could be useless or even harmful. “Resource curse,” “Dutch 
disease,” and “rentier” behavior are theoretical rationales for establishing NRFs. 
Corruption is viewed as a “transmission channel” of natural resource effects on growth. 
Guidelines to evaluate NRFs for transparency and accountability were developed. 
Analysis of selected NRFs’ websites revealed that Norway and Alaska provide directions 
to incorporate transparency into a NRF. Alberta demonstrates that even if democracy is 
strong, a lack of transparency and accountability decreases effectiveness of a NRF. 
Venezuela and Kazakhstan demonstrate a fragility of a NRF when bureaucratic elites 
keep a NRF from public oversight. Azerbaijan shows that steady disclosure efforts can 
improve a NRF’s performance, though not by much if public involvement is low. 
A variety of mistakes were made in designing the Russian Stabilization Fund: in 
predicting oil market dynamics and, consequently, in setting the threshold and base prices 
of oil. The lack of proper legislation and checks and balances blocked a chance to fix 
these mistakes early on.  The research concludes with policy recommendations for the 
government of Russia: to clarify the Fund’s mission, to strengthen its legal foundation, to 
diversify its investment strategy, to establish an auditing policy, to create an overseeing 
public council, to disclose quarterly and annual reports, to maintain a website, and other 
improvements.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
In the last 30 years a variety of Natural Resource Funds (NRFs) were created in 
different resource-rich countries and territories to help manage their natural resource 
wealth. NRFs have a variety of forms, ranging from separate institutions to little more 
that a governmental account. These funds have been expected, through stabilization of  
fiscal policy and savings of a portion of revenues in their countries, to tackle such 
negative effects of revenues from natural resources as exploding or volatility of prices, 
“Dutch Disease” and “Paradox of Plenty.” The funds have also been expected to promote 
good governance in managing of natural resource endowments through transparency and 
public accountability of their operations. 
In their years of operation it has become evident that the effectiveness of the 
NRFs as a fiscal policy instrument is mixed, and resource-abundant countries can 
implement sound fiscal policy just as effectively without a NRF as with one (Davis and 
others 2001).  Some scholars believe that a real value of a NRF is to be a political 
instrument, especially in new democracies and non-democratic states, that forces 
governments to be honest about what they are earning and spending. 
Natural Resource Funds around the world differ from each other in goals, 
objectives, organizational structures, and spending patterns. In this paper we do not argue 
the efficacy of different functions of a NRF. Instead, we suggest that a NFR can be 
viewed as a complex policy institution that can serve as an instrument of fiscal, financial, 
social and developmental policies, with substantial political influence. An argument of 
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this paper is that in order to be successful in any of these functions, a NRF must be 
transparent, accountable, and open for public participation. 
Theoretical Framework 
Fundamental postulates of democratic governance serve as theoretical bases for 
this research in general. Access to information and accountability are necessary 
conditions for effective performance of any financial institution in a market economy. 
Political institutions in a democratic society do not work without separation of powers, 
checks and balances, publicity, and freedom of expression. In particular, “resource 
curse,” “paradox of plenty,” “Dutch disease” and “rentier” behavior will be viewed as 
theoretical rationales for establishing NRFs.  
Special theoretical attention will be paid to the relationship between abundant 
natural resources and corruption. Some scholars argue that abundant natural resources 
stimulate the development of corruption. Oil-exporting countries, according to 
Transparency International’s World Corruption Index, are considered especially corrupt. 
Moreover, Carlos Leite and Jens Weidermann found that corruption functions as a 
“transmission channel of natural resource effects on growth” and, consequently, 
exacerbates the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon (Leite and Weidermann 1999). Based on 
this theoretical funding we can conclude that NRFs as instruments of public policy must 
be transparent and accountable to tackle not only Dutch Disease, but corruption itself. 
Only by being transparent and accountable can NRFs mitigate negative outcomes of the 
“resource curse” associated with petroleum and other minerals. Without transparency, a 
NRF could be useless or even have “adverse impacts” (Davis and other 2001:7). 
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Hypothesis, Variables and an Evaluation Tool 
A Hypothesis is as follows: The more transparent, accountable, and open for 
public governing any NRF is, the more likely this fund will perform effectively in terms 
of revenues and public spending. 
Independent variables: Transparency can be measured as the scope of information 
about a fund’s operations presented in comprehensible language and available for the 
broad public. Accountability can be viewed in terms of sound internal and external 
auditing policies. Level of public participation can be observed through activities of 
overseeing bodies, outcomes of related public hearings, and forums. 
Dependent variables: The dynamics of a fund’s principal and returns on portfolio 
are determinants of revenues. Addressing budget deficits, repaying foreign debts, 
implementing social projects, and distributing dividends directly to citizens from NRFs 
are indicators of a sound spending strategy. 
For the purpose of measuring the independent variables, guidelines for Natural 
Resource Funds were developed. These guidelines do not pretend to be exhaustive, but 
they represent a policy tool created for the purpose of this evaluation based on analysis of 
the literature. 
However, because of restricted access to information about funds’ operations 
around the world, the hypothesis is only tested to a limited extent. Strictly speaking, only 
the level of transparency, as a scope of information presented on NRFs’ websites, is 
evaluated directly for six selected NRFs. Accountability and public involvement are 
checked indirectly, as availability of audit and overseeing  bodies’ reports on funds’ 
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websites. In addition, accountability lines are analyzed for two selected funds. 
Independent variables of selected funds are taken from estimates by other scholars. 
The primary source of data is official websites of selected NRFs and other 
governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
Narrow Scope of Analysis and Research Questions 
The narrow scope of this research is the Stabilization Fund of the Russian 
Federation, which was established in December 2003 by the legislature (Duma). The 
launching of the Russian Fund reflects the government’s desire to achieve a greater 
control over oil revenues compared with the preceding Yelsin period, when most 
revenues ended up in the hands of a few oligarchs.1 Scholars are far from a consensus on 
the advantages of establishing an oil fund in a country with questionable budget 
discipline. Still, other scholars believe that this fund can help to establish some regularity 
and predictability in the management of resource revenues in Russia. 2 
The law set a base threshold for the overall amount accumulating in the Fund after 
exceeding which the government has the right to withdraw money from the Fund. Within 
just one year, this threshold was surpassed.  
Calls for the “easy money” from the Fund have intensified in Russia these days. 
Several major teams have formed around the issue of tapping money from the Fund. 
Most regional governors have favored utilizing the oil money for various investment 
projects. A business lobby has called for distributing funds in the form of developmental 
loans. There are some exotic ideas as well. For example, one politician, Sergey Mironov, 
suggested opening a personal account for each newborn in Russia with $10.000 on this 
                                                 
1 Russia’s Growing Dependence on Oil and Its Venture into a Stabilization Fund. Prepared by the Institute for 
the Analysis of Global Security. http://www.iags.org/n0328052.htm. 
2 Ibid. 
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account. A child would be able to take this money on reaching 18 years old. Until that 
time, the money would be used for high-tech infrastructure development in Russia.3 
In 2005, under the pressure of economists, led by Finance Minister Kudrin, some 
of the fund’s money was spent for early repayment of Russia’s foreign debt and covering 
a shortfall in the pension fund. 
It appears that effectiveness of the Russian Stabilization Fund as a fiscal policy 
and financial institution is mix. The Russian Account Chamber calculated that the Fund 
did not earn, but lost in 2005 approximately $820 million because of inflation and a poor 
investment strategy (Kipelman 2005:71). 
At first glance, the level of transparency and accountability is very low. If this 
situation continues there will be a risk that the Russian Fund will become a secret account 
for the Russian elite’s private spending. 
In this connection, the first research question is: why did all this happen with the 
Russian Fund? If the hypothesis is right the second research question will be: What 
should be done in Russia to increase fiscal transparency, public accountability and 
participation in managing the Russian Stabilization Fund. Major policy recommendations 
will be elaborated for the Russian government. Some of them will be interesting for 
foreign governments and international organizations dealing with natural resources in 
Russia. 
As for the structure of the thesis, Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to analysis of NFRs’ practices to test the hypothesis. The topic of 
Chapter 4 is current developments with the stabilization fund in Russia and policy 
recommendations. 
                                                 
3 http://www.mironov.ru/Position/18275.html.  
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2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCE FUNDS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to prove theoretically that transparency, 
accountability and public participation are necessary conditions for any Natural Resource 
Fund (NRF) to operate successfully as an institution for managing public natural resource 
wealth. However, they are definitely not sufficient conditions by themselves. Efficient 
functioning of any NRF depends on many other factors that mostly relate to strict fiscal 
policy and effective financial performance by a team of professional investors with a 
fund’s money on the world financial market. An effective spending strategy is equally 
important as earnings. However, the key point of this thesis is that NRFs must be 
accountable and open for public scrutiny.  Without this, even a perfect financial 
performance of NRFs will not help people of resource-abundant countries to prevent 
benefits from their natural resource endowments from being spent ineffectively or from 
flowing to the private accounts of top bureaucrats. 
 
2.1. “Resource Curse” as a Rationale for Establishing Natural Resource Funds 
 
Negative development outcomes associated with petroleum and other minerals are 
known as the “resource curse.” This is the phrase used primarily by economists (Gelb 
1988; Auty 1997; and Sachs and Warner 1995). Auty (1997) found that the Asian 
“tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and others), which are poor in 
natural resources, grew four times more rapidly than resource-rich Latin America and 
African countries between1970 and1993, despite the fact that the “tigers” had half the 
savings. This phenomenon became known as the “resource curse” hypothesis (Auty and 
Mikesell 1998:6). A comprehensive study by Harvard economists Jeffrey Sachs and 
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Andres Warner demonstrates that countries whose natural resource exports composed a 
high percentage of gross domestic products had abnormally slow growth rates between 
1971 and 1989 when compared to non-resource-based development models, drawing on 
data from 97 developing countries. The negative relationship holds true even after 
controlling for many variables found to be important for economic growth by previous 
authors (1995:2). The greater the dependence on oil and mineral resources, the worse the 
growth performance, a finding that has been confirmed by economists in the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (Leite and Weidermann 1999). 
Another broadly acknowledged term to describe the gap between the promise of 
natural resource wealth and the perversity of its performance is “paradox of plenty,” by 
Terry Lynn Karl (1997).  As Svetlana Tsalik (2003:1) mentioned in the Caspian Watch 
study, such terminology as “Dutch Disease,” “flawed prosperity,” “economic 
indigestion,” and even “the devil’s excrement”4 have been utilized to describe this 
essential paradox:  resource-abundant economies underperformed in almost every area of 
progress ranging from human development, economic growth, democracy and good 
governance, and preserving the peace. 
From a policy perspective, while it is important to know if a curse exists, it is 
perhaps more important to know the mechanism by which it casts its spell.  Identifying 
the mechanism of this curse allows for designing not only a policy to cure the problem, 
but also a policy to prevent the problem. 
From the broad literature review, the explanation for poor growth performance on 
the part of resource-exporting countries can be roughly divided into two categories: the 
                                                 
4 This term was invented by former Venezuelan Oil Minister and OPEC co-founder Juan Pablo Perez. 
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economic effects and the institutional impact of natural resources. 5 Some authors label 
these effects as direct and indirect (Leite and Weidmann 1999:8). 
The main economic effects include the Dutch disease and volatility (Gelb and 
Associates 1988; Hausmann and Rigobon 2002). The Dutch disease is the tendency for 
the real exchange rate to become overly appreciated in response to positive shocks, which 
leads to a contraction of the tradable non-resource sector (Sach and Warner 1995:6). 
Natural resource ownership exposes countries to volatility, because the supply of natural 
resources exhibits low price elasticities of supply (at least in the short term) (Hausmann 
and Rigobon 2002:7). It means that oil price shocks do not follow relatively equal shifts 
in the supply of oil to the world market. Thus, for countries where oil revenues represent 
a significant percent of GDP, oil price shocks produce income shocks of GDPs which 
influences investments and income distribution.6 
The institutional approach focuses on governance issues such as rent-seeking, 
corruption, and bloated public sectors (Karl 1997; Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth 2003, and 
others).  In general, natural resources generate rents that leads to rapacious rent-seeking 
(the voracity effect7), whose adverse manifestation is felt through a political economy 
effect (Lane and Tornell 1997) and increased corruption (Mauro, 1995; and Leite and 
Weidmann, 1999), which adversely affects long-run growth.8 
                                                 
5 This is a kind of sweeping generalization for the purpose of this thesis. Each author pretends to adopt 
his/her own approach to explain the phenomenon of resource curse. For example, Terry Karl in his 
Paradox of Plenty applied an “eclectic approach” as a combination of “sectoral, Marxist, dependency, 
rational-choice, organizational, and staple theories without fully espousing any of them. (Karl 1997:xvii)” 
6 For example, the standard deviation of oil price changes has been about 30 to 35 percent per year. For a 
country where oil represents about 20 percent of GDP, a one-standard deviation shock to the price of oil 
represents an income shock equivalent to 6 percent of GDP (Hausmann and Rigobon 2002:7). 
7 “The “voracity effect” is the more than proportional increase in discretionary redistribution in response to 
an increase in the row rate of returns in the “efficient sector,” in the Lane, P. and Tornell, A. (1997) 
“Voracity and Growth.” Harvard Institute for Economic Research. Discussion Paper No. 1807, p. 15.  
8 See more about a relationship between corruption and economic growth in 1.2. 
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In the most recently published article on the issue, Isham (2005:7) and others 
conclude that the relationship between rich natural resource endowments and poor 
development has been explained by two broad schools of thought: political science and 
economics. The authors provide a thoughtful, clear summary of the mechanisms of 
causation identified in economic and political science literature. 
According to Isham and others, political scientists generally argue that certain 
natural resources undermine democracy through what they term “rentier” effects 
(2005:8). They based their analysis on Ross’s (2001) empirical investigation of 
consequences when government can easily extract revenues from a few sources. First, the 
state has less need for taxation, and citizens have less incentive to develop the civil 
society that is a precondition for democracy.9 This frees resource-exporting governments 
from the types of citizen demands for fiscal transparency and accountability that arise 
when people pay taxes directly to the government. Second, with the exogenous revenues, 
governments can “mollify dissent” by buying off critics and providing benefits for 
particular groups of the population. Third, the state possesses resources to suppress 
directly any ideas against the regime. The authors also argue that resource income 
insulates governments from pressure for institutional reform because their “budgetary 
revenues are derived from a small workforce that deploy sophisticated technical skills 
that can only be acquired abroad.” (Isham and others:10) 
According to Isham and others, economists usually explain the resource course 
via two core mechanisms: Dutch disease and “entrenched inequality effect.”10 
                                                 
9 See, for example, {some other authors}: Lipset (1959), Moor (1966), and Inglehart (1997). 
10 The “entrenched inequality” effect argues that divergent growth trajectories [in] South and North 
America over the last two hundred years can be explained by reference to the types of crops grown, the 
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Isham and others argue that a combination of both these approaches into “a 
political economy story” based on “social divisions effects” and “governance effects” 
provides a more compelling explanation, at least for the divergent growth experience of 
developing countries over the last forty years (2005:10).11 They further argue that certain 
types of natural resources, such as “oil, diamonds, and plantation crops,” can be easily 
captured by the elite–simultaneously exacerbating social tensions, weakening 
institutional capacity, strengthening corruption, and thereby undermining the ability and 
the willingness of governments to respond promptly to economic shocks.12 Thus, 
abundant natural resources not only generate poor governance itself through rent-seeking 
behavior; but poor governance and corruption function as the catalyst of slow 
development because the government cannot react properly to the economic challenges 
of natural endowments. 
Taking into consideration the political economy approach, we can suggest that a 
NRF could serve as a mechanism for alleviating a variety of negative outcomes of 
resource abundance, such as social tensions, weakened institutional capacity and 
economic shock. 
The primary goal of NRFs in many countries is to soften negative macroeconomic 
outcomes: Dutch disease and volatility through stabilization of fiscal policy from swings 
in resource revenues, and savings for future generations. A strong and transparent 
governance climate is an essential underpinning for such revenue management. Without 
                                                                                                                                                 
extent of property rights regimes enacted to secure their sales and the timing and the nature of colonization 
(see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).   
11 Many other scholars advocate a political economy approach when studying any oil related topic, and 
exclude geological issues. For example, Claes used a political economy approach to study the oil-producer 
cooperation (Claes 2001: 366).   
12 Ibid, p.10. 
  - 11 -  
 
proper publicity and a strict budget discipline, the financial performance of any resource 
fund cannot be successful because there is always a temptation for a government to spend 
“easy money” according to political, but not economic reasons. 
To alleviate social tensions and create trust between governments and citizens, a 
NRF could serve as an open public policy institute. Political leaders need to regard their 
country’s natural resources as national endowments, and provide transparency and public 
participation in managing these endowments for their citizens because these resources do 
not belong exclusively to the current government or generation, but to all citizens and 
generations. As Joseph E. Stiglitz stated, “To use these resources for one’s own benefit, 
leaving future generations impoverished, is to steal their patrimony.”13 Turning oil 
revenues into long-term benefits for a state’s people ultimately depends on the quality of 
public policy. As Karl and Gary (2004:4) perfectly mentioned, “given the right incentives 
for making good policy choices, petroleum revenues can be “black gold” rather than “the 
excrement of the devil.” 
Under ideal conditions a NRF can force governments to plan ahead and to be 
transparent about what they are earning and spending, thus strengthening governance and 
fighting corruption.  By providing information to legislatures and citizens about how oil, 
gas and other minerals are being managed, a NRF can encourage another key component 
of good revenue management: an educated and active citizenry capable of organizing to 
demand accountability for government expenditures. Thus, a NRF can also help to 
develop and strengthen democracy. 
                                                 
13 In the volume: Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? Caspian Revenue Watch. Open Society 
Institute. Central Eurasia Project, p. xi. 
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From this theoretical analysis we can conclude that a NFR, as a policy instrument, 
can help not only to fight the negative outcomes of the resource curse, but can also help 
to manage natural resource endowments in the interests of all people. To achieve these 
policy objectives, a NRF should be transparent, accountable and open for public 
oversight and participation. 
However, there is a more deep and threatening correlation between abundant 
natural resources, corruption, and poor economic performance. Abundant resources not 
only generate corruption themselves through rent-seeking behavior, but the corruption 
originating from the resource wealth worsens significantly the negative economic 
outcomes.  The following section sets forth undeniably relevant theoretical and empirical 
evidence that transparency and accountability are basic initial conditions necessary for 
operating any NRF.  Experience has taught that absent transparency and accountability, 
these funds will likely exacerbate the resource curse’s negative effects.  
 
2.2 Corruption as a “Transmission Channel” for the Negative Effects of Natural  
      Resources on Growth 
The causes and consequences of corruption have received increasing attention 
from social scientists over the past ten years.  As Tanzi argues (2002:19), this is partly 
because the phenomenon of corruption, itself, has been on the increase these last two 
decades due to the increased role of governments in internal and external economic 
relations.  Part of the reason for the increasing interest in corruption is the new 
availability of cross-national data from corruption surveys that began in the beginning of 
the 1980s, specifically under the premises of the International Country Risk Group 
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(ICRG)14 and then Transparency International.15  Also, no doubt, the greater freedom of 
the press in former communist countries has increased public perceptions and awareness 
of corruption in recent years. 
Although there is no universal or comprehensive definition as to what constitutes 
corrupt behavior, the most prominent definitions share a common emphasis upon the 
abuse of public power or position for personal advantage or gain.16  
In a pioneering econometric study of corruption, Mauro (1995) emphasizes that 
corruption may constitute a significant obstacle to investments. The other two studies on 
the role of investment focus on particular components: Wei (1997) on foreign direct 
investment, and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) on public investments.17 Neither Wei (1997) 
nor Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) estimate the subsequent impact of corruption on growth. 
The only econometric evidence of a direct effect of corruption on growth is provided by 
Poison (1998) and Rama (1993).18  
                                                 
14 Since 1980, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) evaluates economic, political and financial risk 
and warn of major changes in more than 100 countries. http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html.  
15 Transparency International (TI) is the leading global non-governmental organization devoted to 
combating corruption.  Its mission is to create change towards a world free of corruption. TI was 
established in 1993. http://ww1.transparency.org/index.html.  
16 The succinct definition utilized by the World Bank is “the abuse of public office for private gain.” This 
definition is similar to that employed by TI.  See World Bank 1997, p. 8. See also Transparency 
International. 1996. The TI Sourcebook, edited by Jeremy Pope. Berlin: TI, p.1. The World Bank definition 
includes the activities of private agents who subvert public policies and processes for competitive 
advantage. 
17 Wei (1997) uses individual survey responses to construct a measure of corruption-induced uncertainty. 
He found that the uncertainty associated with corruption reduces foreign direct investments. Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) provide cross-sectional evidence that higher corruption is associated with lower quality of 
public infrastructure. 
18 Poison (1998) analyzes the effect of economic security on 53 countries over the period 1984-95. In the 
context of a growth equation, this study includes measures on investment, openness and corruption as 
exogenous variables, and finds that corruption significantly reduces economic growth rates. Rama (1993) 
endogenizes lobbying costs incurred by the firm. Using data for Uruguay over the period 1947-98, and 
regressing long-run growth rates on sectoral and aggregate investment rates, this study finds that lagged 
values of restrictive regulations decrease growth at the aggregate level.   
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There are very few studies directly reflecting the impact of abundant natural 
resources on corruption.  The problem arises from the possible impact of windfall gains 
on rent-seeking behavior. Khan (1994), for example, attributes the pervasiveness of 
corruption in Nigeria to the oil boom. Lane and Tornell (1997) point out that trade 
windfall gains may cause a “feeding frenzy” in which competing groups fight for the 
natural resource rents, thereby inefficiently exhausting the public good. Lane and Tornell 
based their empirical research on three countries’ windfall experiences during the period 
of high oil prices between 1974 and 1986, Nigeria, Venezuela and Mexico (22). 
Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann (1999), in their famous paper “Does Mother 
Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption and Economic Growth,” investigate the 
two main causality lines: the determinants of corruption with a special emphasis on the 
role of natural resource abundance, and the growth effects of corruption. Both issues 
were studied theoretically, within a general equilibrium framework, as well as 
empirically within a simultaneous equation model with both economic growth and 
corruption endogenized (3). 
As a measure of corruption, they use the ICRG corruption index. The index is 
scored on a scale of 0-6, with lower scores indicating that “high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected 
throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.” (Leite 
and Weidmann 1999:17). The data on natural resource exports as a share of GDP are 
originally taken from Sachs and Warner (1995).19  
                                                 
19 They include into the regression equation also such independent variables as “trade openness”, “rule of 
law” and “political instability” as the rent-seeking literature suggests (19).   
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Their two main empirical results support their initial hypothesis of the corruption 
channel’s being an important explanation for the slow growth of resource-rich countries: 
first, “capital intensive natural resources are a major determinant of corruption”; second, 
corruption lowers economic growth. Another interesting empirical result is that neither 
the corruption nor the growth is different in Africa than elsewhere (Leite and Weidmann 
1999:30). Thus, this result denies the proposition about cultural roots of corruption. 
Analytically, Leite and Weidmann (1999) focus on effects of two instruments of 
anti-corruption policies: improvements in monitoring technology versus increases in 
penalties. They found that institution building (improvements in monitoring technology) 
tends to be more effective in less developed countries, while stricter enforcement 
(increases in penalties) is predicted to be more effective in more developed countries.20 
As a remedy, Leite and Weidmann (1999) stress the importance of strong 
institutions in the wake of natural resource discoveries as a way to curb the associated 
negative growth effects of corruption (31). This is especially true in less developed 
countries, where natural resource booms and busts have a much higher relative impact on 
both the capital stocks and the extent of corruption, and confront generally weaker and 
less adaptable institutions. We can interpret their results as follows: ceteris paribus,21 a 
resource-abundant country would generate corruption more rapidly than another country 
without natural resources wealth. 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 30. 
21 A Latin phrase, literally translated as “with other things [being] the same.” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceteris_paribus.  
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The Transparency International’s World Corruption Index supports this 
proposition.22 In 2005, totally159 of the world's countries are included in the survey. The 
scores range from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). A score of 5.0 is the 
number Transparency International considers the borderline figure distinguishing 
countries that do and do not have a serious corruption problem. According to this survey, 
only Norway, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have corruption index higher than 5.0 
among countries with net exports exceeding 1 million barrels per day (Table 1). Other 
main net exporting countries have serious corruption problems. Such less developed oil-
exporting countries as Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, Libya, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are 
considered especially corrupt with an index less than 3.0. Russia had a score of 2.4 in 
2005 that indicates a high level of corruption. 
Table 1. The Level of Corruption Among the Top World Oil Net Exporters 
Country Net Oil Exports
(million barrels/day) 
2004* 
Country Order 
Rank of 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception 
Index 2005  
1. Saudi Arabia 8.73 70 3.4 
2. Russia 6.67 126 2.4 
3. Norway 2.91 8 8.9 
4. Iran 2.55 88 2.9 
5. Venezuela 2.36 130 2.3 
6. United Arab Emirates 2.33 30 6.2 
7. Kuwait 2.20 45 4.7 
8. Nigeria 2.19 152 1.9 
9. Mexico 1.80 65 3.5 
10. Algeria 1.68 97 2.8 
11. Iraq 1.48 137 2.2 
12. Libya 1.34 117 2.5 
13. Kazakhstan 1.06 107 2.6 
14. Qatar 1.02 32 5.9 
15. Azerbaijan 0.319 137 2.2 
*Table includes all countries with net exports exceeding 1 million barrels per day in 2004 excluding 
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan produces less than 1 million barrels/day. However, we included Azerbaijan for the 
purpose of this research. 
Source:   1. Energy Information Administration. The US Government. Non-OPEC Fact Sheet. 2004. 
2. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. 2005. Transparency  
                  International.  
                                                 
22 It is a composite index, drawing on 16 surveys from 10 independent institutions, which gathered the 
opinions of businesspeople and country analysts. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html.  
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There are a significant number of grandiose “white elephant” projects in which 
countries, characterized by enormous corruption in awarding import quotas, industrial 
licenses, and trade franchises: low-cost credits become the normal way of doing 
business.23  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the external policy environment contributes to 
overly centralized power and rent-seeking of oil-producing countries’ governments by 
outsiders’ pursuit of oil there. The global oil corporations, because of their tremendous 
power and strength, act sometimes with complete disdain for local norms and regulations, 
bribing the governments (Levenstein and Wooding 2005). The global oil companies 
manipulate existing laws and create new laws in their own interest (Karl 1997).  For 
business people it is more effective to deal with mono-powerful local elite than with a 
democratic polity. International financial institutions also support resource’s perverse 
development cycle by routinely encouraging development strategies based on the 
“resource comparative advantage.” 
The classic weapons for fighting corruption are “checks and balances,” budget 
transparency and public participation in policy-making. If the government of a resource-
abundant country is not accountable, business lacks transparency, the economy is weak 
and public participation absent; then rent-seeking and corruption will likely result.  In this 
case, easy petrodollars will continue to pour without restrictions, according to political 
and personal preferences of local elites, limiting the resources for economic growth.  
Governments of resource-rich countries should pay particular attention to “checks 
and balances” issues when creating new policies and institutions, because a resource-rich 
                                                 
23 Examples abound: a mountain-top resort in Venezuela, the largest airport in Saudi Arabia, a man-made 
river in Libya, the Trans-Railway in Gabon, and a new capital city, Abuja, in Nigeria (Karl and Gary 
2004:2). 
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country will more likely generate corruption more rapidly than a resource-poor country 
with similar politico-economic characteristics. 
If a government of any resource-abundant country, especially a less developed 
one is considering establishing a NRF as a response to its hydrocarbon booms and busts, 
the first question should be: to what extent will the design of this fund ensure 
transparency, accountability and public participation in the management of the natural 
resource endowments. Otherwise, the fund, filled with “oil rent,” will likely contribute to 
“rentier” behavior of the top bureaucracy and to corruption, even if it performs 
effectively as a financial institution. 
2.3. A Properly Designed Natural Resource Fund as a Policy Instrument to Manage  
       Resource Wealth 
 There is no generic term for funds of natural resources.  Some authors commonly 
use the abbreviation “NFR,” but decode it differently. For example, Davis, Ossowski, 
Daniel, and Barnett (2003:273) mean “nonrenewable resource fund” when using this 
abbreviation. The Caspian Watch analysts means “natural resource fund” when using the 
same abbreviation (Tsalik 2003).24  Some authors clearly distinguish between the two 
main types of NRFs, and label them either Stabilization Funds or Savings Funds (Fasano 
2000).  Some authors and policy makers specify the type of natural resource relevant for 
                                                 
24 I prefer to use the term “natural resource fund” for this thesis because it is simpler than “nonrenewable 
resource fund”. However, I admit that  “nonrenewable resource fund” reflects better  the bottom line of the 
phenomenon. 
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a particular country, when giving the title for a specific fund.25  And there are other 
variations in their titles.26 
There is no one broadly accepted definition of a Natural Resource Fund either. 
This thesis employs the definition by the Caspian Watch analysts. They define NFRs as 
“a mechanism that some countries have adopted to address the principal challenge facing 
by budgets dependent to a great extent on revenues from the export of natural resources.” 
(Tsalik 2003:18). The general justification for such funds is that some share of 
government revenues derived from the exploitation and export of nonrenewable resources 
should be put aside for the time these revenues decline, because the price has fallen, the 
resource has been depleted, or both (Davis and others 2003:273-274).  A stabilization 
fund is designed to stabilize revenue flows and expenditures. A savings fund is designed 
to create a store of wealth for future generations by converting a depletable revenue 
stream into a perpetual income flow. 27 There is one other type of NRF – a financing 
fund. In the financing fund the operational rules are designed so that it effectively 
finances the overall budget balance.28 Appendix I summarizes the main features of the 
three types of NRFs. 
Rules for accumulation of fiscal resources in NRFs in different countries tend to 
be price-contingent (accumulation of revenues greater than at a target price), as in the 
case of the Chile Copper Stabilization Funds (CSF); or revenue-contingent (fifty percent 
                                                 
25 Chile’s Copper Stabilization Fund, Oman Oil Fund, Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources Stabilization 
Fund, Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste 
26 Oman's State General Reserve Fund, Kuwait's Reserve Fund for Future Generations, Alaska Permanent 
Fund and others. 
27 The nomenclature may be misleading. Strictly speaking, it is not possible to “stabilize” flows to the fund 
as long as oil prices are unstable. The stabilization fund therefore attempts to stabilize the flows to the 
budget by saving during booms and spending during busts.   
28 The Norwegian State Petroleum Fund operates on this basis. Recently, The Norwegian State Petroleum 
Fund was transferred to the State Pension Fund. Since January 2006, the management of the Petroleum 
Fund has been part of the State Pension Fund. 
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of the resource revenue), as in the case of the Alaska Permanent Fund; or both (fifty 
percent of all oil revenue above a reference price), as in the case of the Venezuela 
Stabilization Fund Rule (see table 2). 
Table 2. Rules for Accumulation Fiscal Resources in Different NRFs  
NRFs with a Price-
contingent Rule 
The Rule of 
Accumulation 
Revenue-contingent 
NRFs 
The Rule of 
Accumulation 
Oman Oil Fund Accumulation of 
revenues greater than at 
a target price 
($15/barrel) 
Kuwait's Reserve Fund 
for Future Generations 
10% of all budget 
revenues 
Venezuela 
Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Fund 
Rule* 
Accumulation of 
revenues greater than a 
cut-off price (flexible, 
can be easily changed) 
Alaska Permanent Fund, 
USA 
25 percent of all mineral 
lease rentals, royalties, 
royalty sales proceeds, 
federal mineral revenue-
sharing payments 
Chile’s Copper 
Stabilization Fund 
Accumulation of 
revenues greater than a 
annually projected price  
The Norwegian State 
Petroleum Fund/ State 
Pension Fund 
All petroleum revenue 
after the coverage of 
non-oil budget deficit 
* Actually, Venezuela’s Fund represents both methods; 50 percent of all oil 
revenue above a reference price. 
Source: The NRFs’ Legislations. 
 
Withdrawal provisions have tended to be more discretionary than rules-based, in 
terms of transfers to the budgets as needed (Alberta, Kuwait, and others), with some 
control and oversight in most cases by the ministry of finance, the central bank, or other 
government officials (Davis and others 2001; Fasano 2000) (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Withdrawal Provisions for Some NRFs 
NRFs Provisions  
Kuwait's Reserve Fund for Future 
Generations 
Financing of the state budget deficit 
Alaska Permanent Fund, USA Approximately 50% of the fund earnings are paid to the 
Alaska’s people; other are reinvested.  It is determined by the 
State Constitution. 
Oman Oil Fund Financing of the budget deficit; investments to the oil 
industry. 
The Norwegian State Petroleum Fund  Transfers to the state budget based on a parliamentary 
resolution 
Venezuela Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Fund Rule 
Since 1999 the president is eligible to make a decision about 
the fund’s spending policy 
Source: The NRFs’ Legislations. 
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Empirically, the effectiveness of funds in mitigating volatility is somewhat 
ambiguous. An IMF study estimates the impact of commodity revenues on government 
spending to determine whether the establishment of a fund has a significant impact on 
government spending (Davis and other 2003:301-302). Based on time-series data for 
countries with funds, expenditure appears to be less correlated with changes in revenues 
than in countries without funds, as would be expected if the funds work as they are 
supposed to; however, this experience is not uniform. In addition, in countries with funds, 
the establishment of a fund did not have an identifiable impact on government spending. 
This suggests that countries with a stricter budget discipline tended to establish a fund 
rather that the fund itself leading to increased expenditure restraint (Davis and other 
2003:303). 
In the case of specific countries—Chile, Norway, and Oman—funds appear to 
deliver a number of favorable outcomes: lower levels of volatility in government 
expenditure, reduced government expenditure, and a higher share of gross fixed capital 
investment (299).  
A number of practical conclusions are drawn from this research: 
o A NFR cannot substitute for effective fiscal management in the short run; 
o A NRF should be designed properly because there are serious risks of 
mismanagement of the natural resource wealth. 
o A fund can complicate fiscal policy if not well integrated with the budget. 
o A fund may spend oil revenues inappropriately. 
o A fund can contribute to lack of transparency and corruption. 
 
o A NRF can serve as a political institution, “a compact between governments and 
citizens” (Tsalik 2003:19) if it is designed as a transparent public entity. 
o Country-specific circumstances matter a great deal when establishing a NRF. 
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A Natural Resource Fund does not guarantee wise management of natural resource 
wealth, but it can be a useful tool–provided it goes hand in hand with a fiscal policy 
framework that strikes the right balance between current consumption and investment in 
development and savings for future generations. The proper design of a NRF is 
important. By introducing a high degree of transparency and contributing to informed 
public debate, the fund can bolster broad support for the strategy of managing the natural 
resource wealth for the benefit of all people, and create trust between government and its 
citizens.    
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3. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC OVERSIGHT:         
     MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD WISE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCE 
     WEALTH 
 
This chapter looks specifically at levels of transparency, accountability and public 
participation among different NRFs around the world.  Related case studies are from 
North and South America, Europe, and the Central Asia.  Best-practice examples, such as 
Norway and Alaska, both democratic states, provide important guidelines for building 
transparency, accountability, and public participation into a NRF to make it successful. 
By contrast, Alberta (Canada) demonstrates that even if democracy is strong, a lack of 
transparency, institutional rigidity, and lack of public involvement decrease effectiveness 
of a NRF as a policy institution. Examples such as Venezuela and Kazakhstan 
demonstrate how vulnerable a NRF is when power is concentrated in the hands of 
bureaucratic elites, manifesting an absence of democracy and ineffective oversight. The 
example of Azerbaijan demonstrates that even if corruption is pervasive steady efforts to 
disclose the fund’s operations can improve the situation for resource wealth management, 
however, not much if the lines of accountability are weak, and the level of public 
participation is too low. 
The first section of this chapter provides methodological guidelines to evaluate 
access to information, accountability and oversight mechanisms of NRFs. The second 
section evaluates the levels of transparency of selected NRFs according to the guidelines 
provided in the first section. The third section compares lines of accountability in 
oversight of Norway’s and Azerbaijan’s funds. 
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3.1 Guidelines to Evaluate Access to Information, Accountability and Oversight 
      Mechanisms of NRFs 
 
For the purpose of this thesis we will not define precisely the theoretical concepts 
of transparency, accountability and public participation.   Rather, we accept they have 
been sufficiently developed by political science and organization theory scholars; and we 
will use the broadly acknowledged meanings of these concepts applicable to policy 
institutions. 
Transparency of any policy institution basically means “access to its information 
for everyone.”  In a broader and related sense, the concept also applies to the 
comprehensiveness and traceability of presented information.  Access to information by 
itself does not guarantee that the presented information is understandable for the broader 
population even if it is easily traceable.29  
Accountability of the operations of any business or public entity means being 
subject to “checks and balances” at any time.  Practically, the “checks and balances” 
principle actualizes through the obligation to hold periodic, independent, external audits 
to control financial operations, and an independent evaluation to monitor performance. 
The idea of public participation basically embraces two practical actions:  first- 
public oversight through an officially established oversight body, and second, an 
opportunity for broad public input into the decision-making process through annual 
forums, referenda or public hearings.  There is a direct correlation between a civil 
society’s opportunity to participate in the development of a NRF and its level of 
understanding of the policies, procedures, practices and mechanisms for managing 
                                                 
29 Some authors refer to traceability as a feature of accountability. 
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petroleum revenue. A lack of understanding hampers the opportunity for the majority of 
civil society to be involved in decision-making, and increases the probability of conflict 
surrounding natural resource revenue. 
There are very few studies that provide insight into the means by which NRFs can 
be designed to limit government’s discretion in misallocating or wasting natural 
resources revenues, and that provide general recommendations for good management of 
NRFs.30 The Caspian Watch analysts who studied the best design practices among NRFs 
found that “checks and balances,” transparency and public involvement are three 
particular factors that contribute to the success of NRFs (Tsalik 2003:19). 
According to them, several mechanisms exist by which transparency can be 
incorporated into a NRF (Tsalik 2003:49). First, all transfers to and from a fund should 
be recorded in the budget and treasury accounts. Second, a NRF, as a keeper of a 
resource endowment, should have the same commitment to disclosure as a public 
company has to its shareholders. Third, a NRF should publish quarterly reports, results of 
external audits, and announcements of tenders.  Davis and others emphasize that reports 
should contain a summary of the asset allocation of the portfolio and summary statistics 
on specific activities of the fund during the year (2003:298). 
Transparency should apply not only to the NFR’s activities, but to the entire chain 
along which natural resource revenues are earned and spent, according to the principles 
of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).31 Many authors argue that most 
misappropriation happens long before oil revenues reach a NRF (Karl 1997, Tsalik 2003, 
                                                 
30 Most studies analyze the specific case for a particular country and do not provide general 
recommendations for establishing NRFs.  
31 The EITI seeks to ensure that the revenues from extractive industries contribute to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. 
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and others). Transparency can begin with a requirement for oil (or other resource 
extraction) companies to disclose all payments made to host governments. 
This, and all other relevant information, should be presented in clear 
comprehensible form and language suitable for the broader population’s comprehension, 
and translated into all official languages in any particular country.  Government should 
inform the civil society about its plans for resource revenue management through a 
variety of media.  All information should be accessible on the Internet, presented on radio 
and television and be available in prescribed libraries. 
Multiple lines of accountability should be created within a NRF, between the 
NRF and the government and between the NRF and the legislature to guarantee 
separation of oversight (Tsalik 2003:51). The legislative body, the president, the treasury 
department, the central bank and the economic development department should have 
some role in overseeing NRF operations, and performance evaluation. These layers of 
accountability only work, however, if the separation of powers is real. There must be 
some contestation and independence among the various organizations that oversee the 
NRF for there to be effective oversight. When legislatures are dominated by the party in 
power and opposition forces are marginal, then they are unlikely to provide effective 
oversight, even if they have the formal authority to do so. 
A NRF must be audited internally and externally according to the best 
international business ethics. External audits should include both financial and 
performance audits and, if relevant, the procedures for the choice of external managers 
for the fund. The financial audit aims to ensure financial compliance, while the 
performance evaluation aims to assess whether resources were used in the best possible 
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way, and adhered to investment guidelines (Davis and others 2003:298). Such audit and 
evaluation should be done by an independent professional company with no financial 
interest in the outcome. 
Transparency and accountability are necessary but not sufficient components of 
informed public participation in democracy. To have an active voice, the public, or at 
least a representative body of the public, needs to have a legitimate and formalized role in 
overseeing and interacting with industry and government. To create a truly participatory 
process in managing natural resource wealth, it is necessary to establish “a fully funded, 
empowered, independent, and aggressive citizens’ institution to provide oversight.” 
(Steiner 2003:72).  This institution functions as a “watchdog” to contribute to an 
informed public debate and sound management of the petroleum wealth. Such public 
oversight bodies have been created in some oil-producing countries.32 
Jennifer Drysdale (2005) provides some practical recommendations to design 
such oversight bodies in order to make them effective. She calls them “Consultative 
Councils, (3)” and posits, first of all, that a Consultative Council (CC) should be 
proposed in the Law, and ideally should have power of veto over government in the 
limited NRF area.  She goes on to state that a CC should be widely representative, and 
have appointees from non-government institutions; that a total number of members 
should be defined, with relevant involvement and participation by women; that it is 
important that the government provide a CC with sufficient resources; and that the 
function, role and purpose of the CC be clear. 33 Drysdale argues it is better not to limit a 
                                                 
32 For example, “The Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council in Alaska”, “The Council of Eminent Persons of  
Timor-Leste,” and others. 
33 For example, a CC could be required to prepare a statement of their purpose and mission in Annual 
Reports.   
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CC to advising parliament only on appropriations of amounts greater than “estimated 
sustainable income” or in a particular period of time.  She further recommends that the 
members of the oversight body be remunerated. 
Public hearings and public forums are the most direct forms of involving citizens 
in the process of bringing transparency to deals between governments and the private 
sector. Hearings and forums provide the opportunity for many citizens to play a role in 
the government decision-making process. It is vital that the law allow for an annual 
forum and/or hearings on issues relating to the NRF. 
A combination of the transparency, accountability and public participation 
features described above is included in the Guidelines for Natural Resource Funds 
(Appendix 2). The guidelines represent a list of generic features deemed applicable for 
the creation or evaluation of a Natural Resource Fund. The features are generated from 
the review of literature on natural resources funds and from various petroleum fund 
models from other countries.34 The guidelines have four parts:  Part I: Access to 
Information (Transparency), Part II: Accountability (Audit Reports), Part III: Public 
Participation (Oversight Mechanisms and Public Input), and Part IV: Crucial Elements of 
a Good Design Related to Transparency and Public Participation. 
We included in the guidelines some additional governance features to be 
considered which related to transparency, accountability and public participation issues. 
First, a NRF should be established as an amendment to a constitution, and all of the 
features of a NRF should be defined by law. The life-span for a fund should be described. 
                                                 
34 An initial idea to create this guide came from Drysdale, Jennifer (2005), Comments on the Timor-Leste 
Petroleum Fund Draft Act. The Petroleum Fund Steering Group, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/Act/05FundActConsult.htm.  
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There can be no misunderstanding should the fund’s existence come into question by 
future governments. There must be a separation of governance between the relevant 
institutions for effective management of the natural resource revenue: legislative bodies, 
treasury departments, central banks and economic development departments. These 
institutions should have some overlapping roles in overseeing the NRF’s operations as a 
part of the “checks and balances” concept. All transfers to and from a fund should be 
recorded in the budget and treasury accounts. Rule changes should be extremely 
cumbersome (a constitutional amendment or a legislative super-majority) to guarantee 
compliance with the initial goal, objectives and design. These features, in fact, serve as 
mechanisms by which transparency and accountability can be incorporated into a NRF. 
These guidelines do not pretend to be exhaustive. Validity and reliability were not 
checked. Nor are the guidelines likes intended to be a universal evaluation tool to 
estimate levels of transparency, accountability and public participation of any NRF. They 
represent an example of a general policy tool based on the knowledge and analysis of 
literature for the purpose of this policy evaluation. Any feature of these guidelines could 
be detailed for a particular research purpose, and additional features could be added.35  
We use these guidelines to estimate the level of access to information for selected NRFs 
around the world in the next section of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 For the purpose of this thesis, we decided to avoid a very detailed breakdown of general features because 
the narrow scope of this paper is the Russian Stabilization Fund which is relatively new and in fact has not 
started to operate with all its functions yet. Thus, we are not able to use this guide to evaluate the Russia 
Fund. 
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3.2 Evaluation of Transparency Levels among Six Natural Resource Funds through the  
      Comparison of Their Websites  
 
In general, a NRF’s transparency can be measured by the scope of information 
about the fund’s operations available for the broad population. This information should 
be generally available on a fund’s website, upon a request, through radio and TV, via 
prescribed libraries, and so forth. A fund as a public policy institution should conduct 
periodic outreach activities such as public presentations and press-conferences, and 
should provide public services such as tours and internships. Some of these outreach 
activities should be offered through their websites. For example, with the Alaska 
Permanent Fund’s website everyone can ask questions, share their comments about the 
fund’s operations, apply for internships, and request publications. Another important 
component of transparency is the comprehensiveness of presented information, which 
can be estimated with qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Some natural resource funds operate in near total secrecy, and are especially wary 
of international observance (Tsalik 2003:44). Good examples are the Persian Gulf 
funds.36 Some simply do not maintain websites, as, for example, the Chile Copper Fund, 
the Russian Stabilization Fund, and the Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources 
Stabilization Fund. This lack of transparency creates difficulties for researchers 
evaluating funds’ levels of accountability with full objectivity.37 To be objective, we 
decided to narrow the research goal and evaluate the scope of information available on 
                                                 
36 The Oman General Reserve Fund publishes no annual report, maintains no website, and shares no 
information with the public. 
37 There is a temptation to say that if they operate in near total secrecy, that they are not transparent and 
accountable at all. The truth is close to this, but should be proven.  
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NRFs’ websites.38 Six funds were selected for evaluation of transparency because they 
maintain their websites in English and, thus, are available for observation by the broad 
worldwide community. They are the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF); the Norwegian State 
Petroleum Fund (SPF)/State Pension Fund since January 2006; the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Fund (AHSF); the Venezuela Investment Fund of Economic Stabilization 
(FIEC); the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAR); the National Fund of 
Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK).  
The guidelines, presented in section 2.1, are used as an evaluation tool. We first 
apply Part I: Access to Information/ Transparency. For the purpose of applying this first 
part several general features were developed. The second of these features, “the details of 
revenue in a fund,” was divided into four categories: inflows by themselves, breakdown 
by source, earnings benchmarks, and return on portfolio.39 The third feature, “the details 
of where and how a fund is invested,” were concretized with such “sub-features” as 
companies/indexes in which the fund holds assets, market value of holdings in each 
company, methodology of investment and risk management, and chosen external asset 
managers. The expenditure feature was broken down by the type of expenditures. Other 
features were kept as presented in the initial guidelines. 
An evaluation scoring system was developed for assessing the transparency of 
NRFs. The scoring system is as follow. If generic transparency information is presented 
on a website, this fund would have “YES” indicated. If there was no such type of 
information at all, the fund would get “NO”. And, if presented information is not 
                                                 
38 The idea came from Tsalik (2003:189). She compared four oil funds’ websites. We added two more 
funds. The scope of evaluation and the scoring system was systemized and developed.   
39 The categorization could be more detailed. For example, “return on portfolio” could be divided by type 
of stocks, bonds, markets, and so on for the purpose of financial analysis. We do not have the purpose of 
analyzing the financial performance of NRFs.  
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complete, the fund would get “PARTLY” indicated. “YES” has a value of 1 point, “NO” 
has 0 point value, and “partly” has 0.5 point value. The higher the score a particular NRF 
receives, the higher the level of democratic governance this fund has. Thereafter, we will 
compare the democratic governance score received through the evaluation process with 
performance results of selected funds, as estimated by other scholars. 
The maximum website transparency score theoretically achievable is 22 points. 
However, no fund can achieve the maximum because no fund entirely commits to the 
principles of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and provides details 
of any payments transferred from oil companies to government or individuals 
voluntarily.40 Alaska Permanent Fund, with 19 points, and the Norwegian State Pension 
Fund, with 16.5 points, are among the leaders (Appendix 3). The Alberta Heritage 
Savings Fund and the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan are in the middle, 
with 11.5 and 13.5 points, respectively. The Venezuela Investment Fund of Economic 
Stabilization and the National Fund of Republic of Kazakhstan have 4.0 and 6.5, 
respectively. 
This is no surprise for the Alaska and the Norwegian Funds. Both funds were 
created in developed democracies with great traditions of budget transparency, a strict 
fiscal policy, checks and balances, and public involvement. The combination of 
democratic governance in these countries by itself, and the high level of transparency of 
their NRFs contribute to the success of both institutions. 
The success of both funds was studied, and empirically proved by many scholars 
(Fasano 2000, Davis 2003, Tsalik 2003, Scancke 2003),  and the effective functioning of 
                                                 
40 See EITI’s website for additional information: http://www.eitransparency.org/.  
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both these funds can be easily traced by any independent researcher through their 
websites. 
The success of any NRF can be seen in terms of benefits received by its citizens. 
The stabilization function is also very important.41 However, it is a macroeconomic effect 
of the fund that is not directly appreciated by citizens, but that contributes to the public 
good in the end. For example, Davis and others empirically proved that in Norway 
“nonrenewable resource export earnings do not bear a statistically significant positive 
relationship to expenditure (2003:299).”42 This means that the Norwegian fund has been 
successful as a stabilization fiscal institution. Sterilized oil money becomes savings, and 
then benefits the people of Norway through covering a non-oil budget deficit, and paying 
pensions from the Fund. 
The Alaska Fund, through income-producing investments and inflation proofing, 
grew from an initial $10 billion in 1977 to over $30 billion by the end of 2005. Thus, the 
principal of the APF has grown three-fold since the Fund’s commencement.43 The fund 
also paid out $13.1 billion in dividends to Alaskan citizens since 1982 (APF Annual 
Report 2005:2). 
The Norwegian Fund was established in 1990; however, the first deposit to the 
fund was made in 1995 because of the severe budget deficit in the beginning of 1990 in 
                                                 
41 This effect can be measured as a differential between natural resource export earnings and government 
expenditure. The stabilization function works if government expenditures grow much slower than earnings 
from resource exports. 
42 Davis and others did not study statistically the Alaska Fund. 
43 Alaska's constitution divides the Fund into two parts: reserved assets (principal) and unreserved assets 
(earnings). Principal comes from: mineral revenue ($8.1 billion into reserved assets to date); special 
legislative appropriations from the Fund's earnings ($7 billion total into reserved assets over time); inflation 
proofing--the annual legislative transfer from earnings to principal ($8.4 billion into principal over time).   
Earnings come from stock dividends/bond interest/real estate rents, and gains or losses from the sale of any 
of these investments. The Legislature has used the earnings for several purposes: dividends, inflation--
proofing principal, special appropriation to principal and fund-related expenses. 
http://www.apfc.org/theapfc/tophow.cfm. 
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Norway. After ten years, the market value of the Petroleum Fund’s combined securities 
portfolio was 1183.9 billion krone,44 or approximately $176 billion. Annually, a part of 
earnings is deposited after covering the non-oil budget deficit. The amount of deposit is 
determined by the Norwegian legislature, unlike in Alaska. Since 2006, a significant 
amount of earnings will go to seniors as pensions. 
Transparency is an inherent feature of the Alaska Fund’s operations because the 
APF is rooted in the belief that Alaskans are the primary stakeholders of their oil 
wealth.45 The law on the Fund states that “all information in the possession of the 
corporation is a public record” (except for confidential commercial information).46 The 
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC)47 Board produces an annual report, which 
must be written in “easily understandable language” and be widely available to the 
public.48 The law states exactly what the contents of the annual report must include: 
audited financial statements, a breakdown of earnings from each investment, and an 
appraisal of the value of each investment, and other details. All this information is 
available though the Internet and upon request. Additionally, the APF’s website embraces 
all legislation and resolutions that apply to the Fund, including papers commissioned for 
the trustees and archival reports (Appendix 3). 
A key reason for establishing the Norwegian Fund was the desire to make more 
transparent the policy choices available to the country, in the face of a decline in oil 
revenues and an increase in pension expenses (Davis 2003, 304). The SPF has helped to 
                                                 
44 Norway’s State Petroleum Fund’s website: 
http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/p10001683/bn.html.  
45 Alaska constitution, Article VIII, Section 2. 
46 Alaska constitution. Sec. 37.13.200. Public access to information. 
http://www.apfc.org/fundlaw/ConstAndLaw.cfm.  
47 The APFC  is a state-owned corporation  that manages the assets of the APF. 
48 Ibid, Sec. 37.13.170. Reports and publications.  
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provide a long-term framework for the annual process of setting the non-oil budget 
deficit, and finally, since 2006, has become a part of the State Pension Fund. The Norges 
Bank, as the manager of the SPF, is required to submit reports to the Finance Ministry 
four times a year. These reports, as well as the annual reports and external audit reports, 
are available to the public over the Internet (Appendix 3). The reports provide 
information on transfers to and from the budget, all of the Fund’s holdings, their value, 
their returns, risk management methodology, and administrative costs. 
The Alberta Fund in Canada was created at the same time as the Alaska Fund, 
with similar royalty payments and objectives49; however, the AHSF has much less 
savings compared with the APF. The Heritage Fund’s fair value stands at $13.6 billion as 
of December 31, 2005, as reported in the Heritage Fund 2005-06 Third Quarter Report, 
released on February 27, 2006.50 However, throughout its 30-year history, the Fund has 
generated over $28 billion in investment income that has improved the quality of life in 
the province. Unlike the APR, the AHSF was created through the legislative process, and 
as a result changes could be made with a simple majority vote in the legislature. Thus, the 
APF has experienced no change in is objectives and structure, while the AHSF has 
altered many of them in response to shifts in oil revenues and bureaucratic priorities 
(Tsalik 2003:26). Since the legislature does not need direct public approval, Alberta’s 
attempts to engage the public in the debate about the Fund have not been as extensive as 
those in Alaska. The AHSF was managed by the provincial treasury51 and subordinated to 
the governor’s cabinet, while the APF was created as a public corporation. As a public 
                                                 
49 They could be compared methodologically because both funds were created by independent territorial 
units in democratic countries (Alaska State, USA and Alberta Province, Canada), and had similar inflows 
and goals.  
50 The Alberta Heritage Saving Fund’ website: http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/ahstf/history.html.  
51 In 2001, management of the AHSF was transferred to the Ministry of Revenue.  
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corporation, APF allows access to its information to everyone. Because in Alberta the 
AHSF is a part of the political process, the information it discloses is comparatively more 
limited (Appendix 3). The Alberta Fund does not have an external audit policy at all. 
Audits are conducted by a local auditor, and do not include a market value appraisal of 
the Fund’s position. As the Caspian Watch analysts conclude, “both the APF and the 
AHSF deserve praise—the former for its endurance and investment success, the latter for 
its spending on public goods—as well criticism—the APF for its institutional rigidity and 
the latter for its lack of it.”(Tsalik 2003:29)  
In 1999, Azerbaijan created the SOFAZ to collect and manage all oil revenues 
due to government from production sharing agreements.52 The assets of SOFAZ as of 
January 1, 2006, stood at 1.3 billion Azeri manat (approximately $1.4 billion).53 The level 
of transparency of the SOFAZ in heavily corrupt Azerbaijan appears to be high, even 
higher that for the AHSF in democratic Canada (Appendix 3). The SOFAZ maintains its 
own well-designed website. Information is presented in comprehensible English and 
Azeri. All main reports are available in their entirety: annual reports, external audit 
reports, decrees and SOFAZ-related budget issues.54 Some scholars support our finding 
that the SOFAZ meet the transparency design criterion (Wakerman-Linn, Mathieu and 
Selm 2003: 353). The SOFAZ has already had positive effects. Not only has it helped 
mitigate real exchange-rate appreciation, but it has also improved Azerbaijan’s image 
among foreign investors. In November 2004, Fitch Ratings upgraded Azerbaijan’s long-
term foreign currency rating from a BB-(2002) to BB with “a stable outlook, reflecting 
                                                 
52 Azerbaijan has also signed over 20 other production sharing agreements with approximately 30 
companies from 15 countries. http://www.eitransparency.org/countryupdates/azerbaijancountryupdate.htm.  
53 SOFAZ’s website: http://www.oilfund.az/inside.php?nID=131.  
54 Ibid. 
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macroeconomic stability, low government debt, and development in the oil and gas 
sector.”55 Azerbaijan has also taken significant steps to implement the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which will promote oil revenue transparency. 
The Committee on EITI established by the Government of Azerbaijan, on January 27, 
2006, announced the release of the Government’s third EITI report, audited by AGN 
MAK,56 an independent auditor.57 Despite all these positive effects, a number of 
ambiguities in the revenue rules were found by another independent audit company, Ernst 
and Young (Tsalik 2003:109). Criteria of expenditures as diverse as assistance to 
refugees and funding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline are also still not clear. The 
accountability lines just do not exist. Unfortunately, the President of Azerbaijan has total 
control of the SOFAZ, and there is a lack of mechanisms for true public oversight.58  
Venezuela has repeatedly established special funds to manage its petroleum 
wealth. The most recent fund is FIEM, established in 1998. The experience with this fund 
was also disappointing, as it has not resulted in an improved fiscal performance (Davis 
2003: 309). The transparency level of the FIEM is close to “zero” (Appendix 3). Very 
limited information could be found on its website; however, even this information was 
not complete and there was even no more recent year than 2002. This is an indication that 
the situation with transparency and accountability is deteriorating. Taking into 
consideration the low level of democracy in this country, and the concentration of 
                                                 
55 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/41980.htm.  
56 The foundation of one of the most respected accountancy practices, incorporated and developed in the 
UAE, was laid in 1981. Today, AGN MAK has emerged as one of the top ten multidisciplinary practices in 
the region. 
57 http://www.oilfund.az/inside.php?nID=131.  
58 See 2.3 section of this paper. 
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political power in the president’s hands, we can conclude that the FIEM is hardly able to 
contribute to fair and wise management of Venezuela’s natural resource wealth. 
In August of 2000, the Kazakh Oil Fund was created. The fund received its first 
deposit of $660 million from the sale of a five-percent share in the TengizChevron 
consortium.59 According to the International Monetary Fund, by September 2004 the 
NFRK balance reached $3.7 billion.60 
The NFRK operates with some transparency, but with great opportunities for 
improvement. The National Bank of Kazakhstan produces periodic reports for the finance 
ministry on the Fund’s investments, but they are not available for public scrutiny. Instead, 
quarterly and annual aggregated statements in a table format are placed on its website.61  
There is no information about the fund’s investment strategy at all. Audit reports, as 
internal as well as external, are not open for public view. There is a very high probability 
that oil revenues could be diverted before reaching the Fund. Oil swaps, the export of 
crude to Russia below market prices, and other similar activities generate net revenues 
that never make it into the NFRK (Tsalik 2003: 152). Kazakhstan’s national oil and gas 
company operates in total secrecy and contributes to the lack of transparency in the 
management of the Kazakh people’s natural endowment. 
According to the Caspian Watch analysts, the creation of multiple lines of 
accountability is a useful mechanism by which transparency can be incorporated into a 
NRF (Tsalik 2003:49-51). A comparative analysis of accountability lines between the 
Norwegian and Azerbaijan Funds in section 2.3 provides additional ideas as to why the 
Azeri Fund has not been successful despite a relatively high level of transparency. 
                                                 
59 http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/mpep.pdf.  
60 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2004/pn04106.htm.  
61 http://www.nationalfund.kz/index.php?uin=1120634887&lang=rus.  
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3.3 Comparative Analysis of Accountability Lines in Oversight of Norwegian  
      and Azerbaijan Oil Funds 
 
The results of the evaluation in the previous section make clear that it is not 
enough simply to disclose information about a NRF’s operations. Rather, transparency 
should be an inherent feature of a resource fund if it is to work.  Many scholars agree that 
there are several crucial mechanisms for incorporating transparency into a fund’s every-
day operations (Davis 2003, Tsalik 2003, Drysdale 2005, Delvin and Lewin, 2005, 
Fasano 2000). Actually, we already mentioned these mechanisms in Section 2.1, and 
placed them into Part VI of the Guidelines. We called them “Generic Good Design 
Features.” 
In this section of the thesis we will emphasize the importance of the proper 
institutional design of a NRF, which can make earnings and spending more transparent. 
More precisely, we will look at the ideal organizational structure of a fund, which 
guarantees separation of power, checks and balances, and public participation in 
managing and overseeing a fund’s operations. Svetlana Tsalik calls the organizational 
structure of a generic NRF “multiple lines of accountability,” meaning that the proper 
institutional structure and design encourages fiscal responsibility and prevents possible 
abuses of fund revenues from despotic political leaders and lobbies (Tsalik 2003:50). As 
we already mentioned above in Section 2.1, accountability lines should guarantee a share 
in management and overseeing NRF operations for a legislative body, a president, a 
treasury department, a central bank, an economic development department, and other 
institutions involved in management of natural resources. In this regard, several 
independent oversight and consulting entities must be established. 
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Two NRFs were selected for comparative analysis of their multiple lines of 
accountability: the Norwegian State Petroleum Fund/ State Pension Fund62 and the State 
Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The reason for this comparative selection is that 
the Norwegian Fund is usually referred to as a model of accountability, with a great 
separation of powers, while the Azerbaijan Fund represents an example of super-
presidential authority in managing a national petroleum fund. 
The Norwegian Fund is one of the world’s largest natural resource funds in terms 
of the volume of principal (savings function). Its stabilization function is also widely 
appreciated by scholars and by its citizens. The broad population of Norway enjoys a 
high level of transparency, accountability and public involvement, and the citizens 
directly benefit from the SPF pension program. The success of the Norwegian Fund has 
many observers asking two main questions: How did they achieve these results? Is the 
Norwegian Fund’s design suitable for any country with abundant natural resources as a 
generic model for their NRF? 
The Norwegian Fund can be viewed as a successful institutional arrangement 
(Fasano 2000:4). Formally, the SPF is a krone account with Norges Bank (the Norwegian 
central bank). The Ministry of Finance is a general manager or “an owner” of the Fund, 
which has delegated operational management of the Fund to Norges Bank. The bank 
manages the Fund’s capital in accordance with provisions laid down by the Ministry of 
Finance. These provisions are set out in a management agreement between the Ministry 
                                                 
62 The Government Pension Fund was established on January, 1, 2006. The Fund is comprised of the 
Government Petroleum Fund and the National Insurance Scheme Fund. The activities in these two funds 
will continue. Thus, the National Pension Fund will not have its own board or administration. As of 
January, 1, 2006 the two parts of the fund are titled "The Government Pension Fund - Global" and "The 
Government Pension Fund – Norway". http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/bn.html.  
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of Finance and the bank.63 Under the agreement, the Ministry of Finance utilizes advice 
from the bank in its work with the Fund’s investment strategy, and the bank advises the 
ministry on strategic choices for the Petroleum Fund. 
The Ministry of Finance’s choice of investment strategy is the key driver of the 
Fund’s risk/return strategy. 64 There is a public consensus in Norway that the Fund must 
act as a professional financial investor. 
The Ministry of Finance and the Norges Bank have a right to incorporate changes 
into the Government Petroleum Fund’s framework based on the consensus between 
them.65 Although such changes do not require legislative approval, in practice the 
Norwegian government has always consulted with parliament and has kept it well 
informed of any developments concerning the Fund (Tsalik 2003: 38). The Office of 
Auditor General, which is appointed by and reports directly to Parliament, ensures 
parliamentary control on Fund operations. In addition, a supervisory council (Norges 
Bank Supervisory Council) examines the executive board’s annual reports, the bank 
financial statements, and the auditor’s reports.66 The Ministry also hires an independent 
auditor to evaluate all financial results on an annual basis (Appendix 4). 
The organizational structure of the Fund has been constantly developed to make 
the fund more financially effective and accountable to the people. Recently, two new 
                                                 
63 English translation of chapter 3.5.2 in the Norway National Budget 2006. 
http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/p10001684/006071-230218/dok-bn.html.  
64 The regulations state that 50-70 per cent of the Fund’s overall portfolio is to be invested in fixed-income 
securities and 30-50 per cent in equities. Where equities are concerned, 40-60 per cent is to be invested in 
currencies and markets in Europe, the remainder in other regions. Where fixed-income securities are 
concerned, 45-65 per cent is to be invested in currencies and markets in Europe, 25-45 per cent in the 
Americas and the Middle East/Africa and 0-20 per cent in Asia and Oceania. 
65  English translation of chapter 3.5.2 in the Norway National Budget 2006. 
http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/p10001684/006071-230218/dok-bn.html.  
66 Resolution of the Supervisory Council Concerning the Financial Statements for 2004. Norges Bank. 
Annual Report. 2004. 
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consulting entities were created to assist the Ministry of Finance in management of the 
Fund. In 2004 the Ministry established an ethics council to advise itself on any exclusion 
of companies called for under the Petroleum Fund’s ethical guidelines. The Ministry is 
responsible for deciding exclusions, based on recommendations from the Petroleum 
Fund’s Advisory Council on Ethics.67 In September 2005, the Ministry of Finance 
appointed a professional advisory council (Investment Strategy Council) to assist the 
Ministry with investment strategy (Appendix 4).68 
Despite the obvious success of the Norwegian Fund in the separation of powers, 
transparency and accountability, there are some features of the Fund’s design that limit its 
applicability as a model for other countries, especially for developing ones with a lack of 
democracy. 
As previously mentioned, a NRF should be established as an amendment to a 
constitution. The SPF was created through the legislative process, and as a result any 
changes can be made with a simple majority vote in the legislature. To date, Norway has 
not experienced a sharp decrease in oil prices. However, if oil prices fall there are no 
impediments to parliament’s authorizing the use of the Fund’s principal, as occurred in 
Alberta with its democratic governance (Tsalik 2003:40). 
As previously stated, the government of Norway has a right to incorporate 
changes into the Petroleum Fund’s framework based on the consensus between the 
Ministry and the bank without the legislative body. To ensure accountability, a 
sophisticated system of checks and balances, and a clear division of responsibilities, were 
set up between the Ministry and the bank (Scancke 2003:327). It appears that in countries 
                                                 
67 Ten companies have thus far been excluded from the Fund. A list of excluded companies, along with 
recommendations from the ethics council, is available on the Ministry of Finance’s website. 
68 The council’s mandate can be seen on the Ministry of Finance’s website. 
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with a weak system of checks and balances, rule changes should be extremely 
cumbersome, either through a constitutional amendment or a legislative super-majority. 
Unlike the resource funds in Alaska, Alberta, and Venezuela, Norway’s SPF does 
not specify what share of oil revenues are to be deposited each year as principal. Rather, 
deposits are determined annually by the legislature. Thus, it is entirely up to the 
legislature to determine how much to deposit to or withdraw from the SPF. Norway has a 
long tradition of budget transparency and a strict fiscal policy. In countries like 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, where budget transparency and controls are still in 
formation, tighter rules on NRF revenues and expenditures are needed. Ideally, these 
rules should be defined by law. 
The Azeri Fund is an independent off-budget legal entity with its own 
administrative structure. Foreign oil companies deposit payments to SOFAZ into a 
special account at the National Bank.69 These deposits do not depend on oil price, but 
represent a fixed percentage of oil proceeds. In this regard, SOFAZ most resembles the 
Alaska Fund. However, the Alaska Fund was established as a public company with a 
great commitment of disclosure and public involvement. In contrast, the Azeri Fund is 
accountable and responsible to only one person in the country--the President of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan.70 There are no limitations to the president’s discretion. There are 
                                                 
69 Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on establishment of the State Oil Fund of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan http://www.oilfund.az/inside.php?zid=2&nID=127.  
70 Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Article 2.1. Moreover, Section 1.6. 
states that “except for rights and responsibilities assigned by Presidential Decrees and by these Regulations, 
the Fund: a) shall not have any rights, responsibilities and shall not bear any commitments in relationships 
with the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, other government bodies, including ministries, state 
committees, public institutions, enterprises and organizations and financial institutions, as well as in 
relationships with any social funds, public and other non-governmental organizations under jurisdiction of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan or of another country; b) shall not bear any responsibility related with 
commitments or guarantees of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, other government bodies, 
public enterprises, institutions and organizations.” 
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no checks and balances to provide oversight. The parliament has no role whatsoever in 
Azerbaijan. Officially, the executive director operates the Fund. However, he is 
appointed by, and can be dismissed only by, the president. An investment board reviews 
the investment strategy of the fund. However, the board consists of the executive director 
and senior officials of relevant SOFAZ departments. The supervisory council is 
appointed by, and subordinated to, the president. The only members of the council not 
directly subordinate to the president are two parliamentary representatives and the 
president of the Academy of Science. The council is currently comprised of eight 
members; and no representatives of any public organization sits on the council. 71 Thus, 
in contrast with Norway, lines of accountability in management of the Azeri Fund are 
extremely simple (Appendix 5). 
Taking into consideration the fact that the fund’s revenues are not incorporated 
into a state budget, this, in tandem with the absolute power of the president over the 
fund’s operations, greatly risks that SOFAZ cannot transfer revenues back to the budget 
in times when the people of Azerbaijan need them.  
                                                 
71 http://www.oilfund.az/manag.php.  
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4. POLICY CHALLENGES FOR MANAGEMENT OF RUSSIA’s PETROLEUM  
    WEALTH 
 
There is no question but that Russia has tremendous natural resources. Indeed, 
Russia holds the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas and has significant proven 
and unproven reserves of oil. Nowadays, Russia is the world’s second largest producer 
and exporter of oil and the first producer and exporter of natural gas.72 Russia is also rich 
in other natural resources, including coal, metals and diamonds. The question is to what 
extent Russia, as a country with abundant resources, is able to provide decent living 
standards to the majority of its population through distribution of revenues generated by 
exporting oil and gas. Another key strategic question is what national interest Russia will 
pursue in the face of high prices on the world oil market. Strategic dilemmas for the 
Russian energy sector are discussed in Section 4.1, below. 
It appears that the latest trend in Russian politics is associated with seeking 
restoration of a centralized political and economic environment, and utilizing its energy 
influence on neighboring countries, former republics of the Soviet Union, as a tool for 
restoring political control on these countries.73 The question is to what extent the oil 
boom of early 2000 contributed to these backward tendencies in accordance with the 
theoretical framework provided in Chapter 1. An adverse development of the Russian oil 
sector as a response to high oil prices is the topic of Section 4.2. 
The Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF) was launched on 
January 1, 2004, as a fiscal policy institution to mitigate volatility of hydrocarbon prices. 
The principal of the RSF is growing very fast, far beyond the initial growth prognosis 
                                                 
72 See Table 1 in Section 1.2, above. 
73 For example, in the Russian-Ukraiane gas conflict of 2005-2006. 
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because of the fast raising of oil prices. It appears that the Russian Fund operates in 
nearly total secrecy. It publishes no annual report, maintains no website, and shares no 
significant financial information with the public. Because of a lack of strict budget 
discipline, a weak civil society, and a high level of corruption, there is the risk that large 
numbers of petrodollars will be spent on interests of the Russian bureaucratic elite. This 
is the point of Section 4.3 of this chapter. 
The final section of this chapter provides recommendations to promote 
accountability and public oversight in the management of Russian’s natural endowment. 
4.1 Strategic Dilemmas for Russia as a Resource-abundant Country 
A country is referred to as being resource-abundant if its budget is largely 
dependent on revenues from the export of natural resources. It is not enough for the 
country to be rich in natural resources; the main prerequisite for being resource-abundant 
is a high budget dependency on income from natural resource trade on the world market. 
For example, the United States has a very high level of oil reserves and production, 
higher than that of Norway, Qatar, Oman, Kazakhstan, and other resource-abundant 
countries. However, the United States is not resource-abundant, by definition, because it 
does not export hydrocarbons.74  
By definition, Russia is a resource-abundant country. In 2005, extraction, 
refining, and transportation of hydrocarbons comprised 26 percent of Russia’s GDP and 
59 percent of its export revenues (Kudrin 2006:30). A Russian state budget experiences 
high dependence on “crude” income, and this was especially true during the period of 
soaring oil prices in the middle of 2000. In 2004, when prices were lower than now, the 
                                                 
74 Oil reserves, production and consumption in 2001. http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/oil.html.  
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oil and gas industry provided 23 percent of budget inflows. In 2005 it was 30 percent. 
According to Kudrin (2006), a fluctuation of the world oil price in amplitude of 23-50 
dollars per barrel creates an alteration of the Russian budget within a range of 16-23 
percent of GDP (31). 
Russia will never be like Saudi Arabia or Norway. The obvious difference lies in 
the fact that despite comparable volumes of oil and gas revenues and production and 
export revenues, Russia has a much larger population.75 Table 4, below, demonstrates 
that the per capita volumes of hydrocarbon production and exports of the same leave 
little, if any, prospect for Russia to ensure normal living conditions for the majority of its 
citizens, based on hydrocarbon revenues alone. It is worth mentioning that, unlike other 
resource-abundant countries, Russia has an extensive domestic consumption of 
hydrocarbons. Thus, the ability to sell oil and gas under high international prices is 
limited. 
Table 4. Per Capita Hydrocarbon Production and Export in Various oil abundant 
countries, 2003  
Production and 
Export per capita 
Kuwait UAE Norway Saudi 
Arabia 
Venezuela Russia  Nigeria
Annual hydrocarbon 
production, ton of 
oil equivalent per 
capita 
55.2 51.9 48.6 25.7 7.1 6.9 1.1 
Annual hydrocarbon 
exports, ton of oil 
equivalent per capita  
27.5 29.4 42.2 15.4 3.7 2.5 0.9 
Source: Counted based on Key World Energy Statistics. IEA. 2005, p. 48-59. 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/key2005.pdf. 
 
From Table 4, above, we can conclude that Russia, in its capacity as a resource-
abundant country is more similar to countries like Venezuela and Nigeria, which also 
                                                 
75 Saudi Arabia – 22.53 million, Norway – 4.57 million, and Russia – 143.43 million. Key World Energy 
Statistics. IEA.  2005, p. 48-59. http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/key2005.pdf.  
  - 48 -  
 
 
have massive populations. The ability of these nations to improve the lives of its citizens 
significantly through oil wealth is obviously very low. Therefore, the pretension of 
Russian authorities of being able to establish a successful state purely on redistribution of 
export oil revenues has no basis in reality and is, in fact, fallacious or at least inaccurate 
(Milov 2006:5). Even skyscraping oil and gas prices are not able to cover up the 
hardships of the Russian economy, the weaknesses of its policy institutions and its poor 
governance. Despite Russia’s resource abundance, Russia cannot become a successful 
state without structural reforms, democratization and marketization, relying purely on 
income from oil and gas export. 
However, it appears that Russia is now moving back (or, at least, is not moving 
forward) in terms of democratic and market reforms. A famous emeritus Russian 
economist, Evgeny Yasin, pointed out that from the middle of 2003 backward political 
changes in Russia have begun following changes in economic life (Yasin 2005:16). 
The dilemma of what path the Russian people should follow has been the subject 
of popular public discourse in Russia since, probably, Peter the Great. There were always 
three main options: to study and learn from the West; to look at, and be influenced by, the 
East; or to follow its own unique Russian path. Nowadays, Russia, in a new political and 
global framework, is still not quite sure where to go. As Vladimir Milov, president of the 
Institute of Energy Policy in Russia, points out, on the one hand, the goal of maintaining 
sustainable development in the globalizing world requires that Russia build a competitive 
and open economy and a modern democratic state. On the other, Russia is still under the 
influence of a totalitarian past and has a temptation to seize global influence by 
sacrificing human rights, openness, economic development, and “promoting of neo-
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imperial foreign policy approaches.” (Milov 2006: 1). For example, Russia will hold the 
G8 Energy Security Summit later this year (2006) and promises a commitment to 
sustainable development and the principles of EITI.76 But, in stark opposition, Russia 
engages in “energy imperialism” with neighboring countries. This centralization of 
political power is clearly driven by authorities, but it is also largely supported by the 
Russian population, according to opinion polls (See Table 5).  
Table 5. The Approval Level of Russian President Putin’s Politics 
               2006 January, 23-27   February, 10-13  March, 10-13 
Approve 71 75 72 
Do not approve 27 23 26 
No answer 2 2 2 
Source: 2006 opinion polls by Levada Center. http://www.levada.ru. 
In the Russian energy sector, this dilemma has been particularly visible. After 
privatization and restructuring of the oil and gas sector in the 1990s, oil and gas became 
the most competitive and rapidly developing sector of the Russian economy. However, 
since mid-2003 Russian authorities have been targeting the oil and gas sector to regain 
control over it, creating a reversal in the economic policy model. 
 
4.2 Adverse Development of the Russian Oil Sector in Response to High Oil  
      Prices in Mid-2000 
 
The theoretical discussion in chapter two explained that the negative use of 
natural resources can undermine democracy through three major “rentier” conditions 
produced by windfall gains and usually manifesting themselves as direct effects which 
are extremely strong, negative and persuasive. In the first such possible effect, the state 
has less need for taxation, and citizens have less incentive to develop and improve upon 
                                                 
76 Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
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civil society. In the second of these effects, the government, using its exogenous 
revenues, purchases media and provides benefits for selected members and groups of the 
population. The third effect, the steady natural resource revenues prevent government 
from instituting needed institutional reforms. All three effects exacerbate corruption. 
Russian authorities have exhibited these behavioral tendencies since the middle of 
2003, after oil prices rose sharply from $23 per barrel in May 2003 to $65 in March 
2006.77  During this same period, the government closed several offices of international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), accused them of espionage78 and took control 
over major media interests.79 Legal, housing, military, and administrative reforms have 
been stagnating. President appointed the Institute of Regional Governors, “Putin’s ears 
and eyes,” as people call them, three years ago. The TI Corruption Perception Index for 
Russia decreased from 2.7 in 2003 to 2.4 in 2005.80 In the energy sector, adverse 
development appears in restoring ownership in the largely privatized oil sector, banning 
the construction of private oil pipelines, rejecting the idea of market restructuring of gas 
giant Gazprom, closing the doors for foreign investors, and using energy as a political 
tool (Milov 2006, Yasin, 2005, Belton 2004).  
In 2003, less than 15 percent of oil production was attributed to state-dominated 
companies, but at the end of 2005 some 35 percent was so attributed, and experts in the 
field believe that by the end of 2006 this share may reach 60-70 percent (Milov 2006:1).  
                                                 
77 During this period of May 2003 to March 2006, Russian export oil taxes increased significantly.  On the 
one hand, this presents an exception to the first rentier effect. On the other, this is an element of rentier 
behavior to get more rent.   
78 By way of other possible examples, there is a “scandal” within the Peace Corps in Russia, and there has 
been discrete periodic questioning of other global NGOs operating in Russia, including inquiries of the 
Eurasia and Soros Foundations.  
79 They arrested Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Media-Most (the biggest Russian independent media 
network), after he broadcast news unfavorable to President Putin. In fact, the Government actually arrested 
nearly all of Media-Most’s executives. 
80 See more information in 1.2. 
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The process of oil industry re-nationalization in Russia appears to have started 
with “the Yukos case.” By early 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos, 
publicly criticized the Russian government for its alleged intention to control all of the oil 
pipelines within Russia.81 Thereafter, the government took swift and decisive action. 
They arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky and accused him of violating tax laws. The 
government demanded that Yukos pay back taxes owed and fines for not having paid 
them in the 1990s. It also froze all assets of the company, which prevented Yukos from 
being able to use its assets as collateral to borrow money for the purpose of paying the 
taxes. Once it became apparent that Yukos would be unable to pay the $28 billion in 
delinquent taxes and fines, the government auctioned off Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos’ 
principal oil-producing unit.82 Rosneft, a state-dominated company, purchased 
Yuganskneftegaz.  The Rosneft’s takeover meant re-nationalization of 11 percent of 
Russia’s oil output (Belton 2004). 
Did the increase in oil prices in 2003 or Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s rash behavior 
cause the government to renationalize Yukos? At a glance, the action appears to stem 
from a conflict of personalities, especially since Mr. Khodorkovsky was financing 
opposition parties to government incumbents and was being praised outside of Russia by 
major politicians around the world. On the other hand, if oil prices had stayed low, the 
government might have wanted a more efficient, independent Yukos to expand 
production and help the economy.  However, with higher oil prices it is more likely the 
                                                 
81 During 2002, Yukos was planning to build a new oil pipeline to bring its oil from Angarck, Russia to 
Datsin, China. The Government postponed the building of the pipeline. 
82 Yuganskneftegaz supplied about 60 percent of Yukos’ production prior to the Government’s 
intervention.   
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case that the government saw an easy way to extract higher revenues for itself by simply 
re-nationalizing the company.83  
Additionally, the re-nationalization of companies may become even easier.  In 
April 2005 the Russian Federal Tax Service appealed to the Constitutional Court to 
remove all remaining protections that tax-evading companies have been, allegedly, 
enjoying since the 1990s. While curbing tax evasion is commendable, it could be that 
virtually every major company in Russia is subject to prosecution, not necessarily 
because of purposeful tax evasion but, as Fak (2005) explains, due to the fact that tax 
laws in the 1990s were too complex and often contradictory. 
 “The era of quick recovery and success of the Russian oil sector, led by private 
initiative and introduction of Western-type engineering and management practices, is 
over. It is replaced by domination of state companies which experience huge financial 
difficulties and upstream production challenges” (Milov 2006:7). The theoretical 
explanation for this phenomenon is Reynolds’ (1999) risk aversion model that explains 
adverse effects of exploration and development of oil reserves. The main idea of the 
model is that small private firms tend to be more risk-seeking than the large state-owned 
companies. In this connection, Russian crude oil production growth has been 
dramatically slowing recently, which some experts fear may be a plateau of matured oil 
fields in Western Siberia. In 2003, the growth rate for crude oil production was 11 
percent, in 2004 it was 8.9 percent, and in 2005 it was only 2.4 percent.84 
At the same time, the geological conditions for exploration and extraction of oil 
and gas in Russia are deteriorating. The majority of production comes from matured oil 
                                                 
83 Some international political economy scholars believe that the beginning of “perestroyka” in Russia was 
attributed to a period of low oil prices in the middle of 1980s. 
84 According to the Institute of Energy Policy in Russia. http://www.energypolicy.ru.  
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and gas fields, and further response to growing hydrocarbon demand would require 
development of the greenfield area in remote regions (Eastern Siberia, North and Pacific 
offshore), but without the existing infrastructure. According to Energy Policy Institute 
analysts, Russia’s financial system is unable to provide the financing needed to invest in 
such projects, and Russian companies are not equipped with the proper technologies 
needed to work in specific exploration areas (Milov 2006:9). 
In this environment, an important issue is the access of foreign investors to 
Russia’s upstream energy sector and infrastructure. However, it appears that the 
government has a plan to restrict foreign equity participation in oil and gas field operators 
through a new subsoil law. The last draft of this new subsoil law was submitted to the 
Duma by the Russian government on June 17, 2005.85  
At first glance, the new law looks to encourage private ownership of oil leases 
and free markets because it allows current license holders (controlling 92 percent of 
Russian oil and 83 percent of its natural gas) to continue operating under the license 
system until their licenses expire. It will also require companies to register those permits 
for exploration as “property rights” (the Draft of Subsoil Law 2005). Therefore, a 
“parallel universe” of license-based oil and gas development alongside contract-based 
development is allowed. While this does create some uncertainty for oil companies, at 
least any disputes between the government and the contract holders will have to be settled 
in court instead of being adjudicated by government regulators. Since courts are more 
independent than the regulatory agencies, this parallel universe may be more favorable 
for private ownership than an exclusive license-based system. The only legal problem is 
                                                 
85 It has been under discussion since 2003. 
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that the Civil Code “lease” contracts have been replaced by “subsoil” contracts, which are 
completely new, and the courts have no experience with such cases. 
On the other hand, items in the draft clearly suggest that the government is 
reestablishing control of the oil industry and restricting foreign equity participation in the 
oil and gas sector.  For example: 
- While the draft does not prohibit foreign investment, it substantially discourages it.  
The government may simply ban the involvement of foreign companies in future 
bidding in an ad hoc or makeshift manner. 86  
- The Russian government may exclude foreign companies from participating in the 
development of Russia’s oil and gas reserves even if foreign ownership of a joint 
venture company is less than 50 percent.  “It means that companies with even one 
percent of foreign participation most definitely will not have access to the auction.” 
(IEP 2005, p. 6). 
- The “temporary operator” clause allows the government the right to select a company 
to operate an oil or gas field for up to one year.  This noncompetitive process is a 
potential way for the government to transfer control of the oil and gas fields to 
“trusted,” i.e., state-owned, companies.87   
 
                                                 
86 Article 60, part 5, says that the “auction coordinator may introduce restrictions (ban) on the participation 
of legal entities which form a group with foreign individuals, individuals without citizenship, or foreign 
legal entities.” (quoted in IEP 2005, p. 5). “The group” that the legislation refers to is defined as “a Russian 
investor and a foreign company [who] jointly own or operate more than 50 % of a legal entity directly or 
through third parties,” “a Russian investor and a foreign company [who] have a possibility to determine 
decisions of other legal entity,” or “a Russian investor and a foreign company [who] are participants of the 
same industrial-financial group.” (IEP 2005, p. 6). 
87 This new legislation does not apply to offshore oil and gas fields.  The relevant law is called “On the 
Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation.” 
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The whole story of restoration of state control in the Russian oil and gas sectors is 
similar to the Mexican model with its ineffective Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex). It has big 
resources, but troubles with production due to economic inefficiency and entry barriers 
for foreign investment, unlike, for example, the Saudi Arabian or Norwegian models. 
Another possible direction of the new energy policy agenda of Russian authorities 
in the energy area is to use energy as a political tool. Russia’s recent gas conflict with 
Ukraine has served as a serious warning to the international community that Russia has 
the ability and the will to effectuate a cutoff of gas supplies as it deems politically 
necessary. The conflict associated with Russian gas cutoffs to Ukraine occurred in late 
2005 - early 2006, at the same time that Russia assumed the G8 presidency.  President 
Putin, in his welcome speech, emphasized the importance of establishing a reliable 
system of energy security as a strategic goal for the G8 and the world community as a 
whole.88 In this connection, there is still hope that Russia will be able to overcome 
imperialistic tendencies and become a reliable energy supplier driven mostly by 
economic motivation, which, in turn, will motivate and improve the stability of Russian 
energy supplies. 
 
4.3 Poor Design of the Russian Stabilization Fund 
 
The Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation (SFRF) was created on 
December 23, 2003, by the Russian legislature. According to law, SFRF becomes a part 
                                                 
88 Putin, Vladimir. “The Upcoming G8 Summit in St. Petersburg: Challenges, Opportunities, and 
Responsibility.” http://nyjtimes.com/cover/03-14-06/UpcomingG8Challenges.htm.  
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of the federal budget when the actual price of oil exceeds the base price of oil.89 The law 
set the base price at $20 per barrel of Urals oil, above which revenues start accumulating 
in the stabilization fund, while the government has the right to withdraw money from the 
Fund if oil prices fall below the base level.90 A base threshold to start withdrawing money 
from the fund was determined by the law as 500 billion rubles (approximately $18 
billion). However, within just one year, this threshold was surpassed. By March 1, 2006, 
the fund had accumulated 1,563 billion rubles (approximately $55.82 billion).91 The 
Ministry of Finance calculated that by January 1, 2007, the Fund grows to 2.1 billion 
rubles (approximately $75 billion). 
There are two main inflow, or income, streams for the SFRF: an oil export tax and 
an oil extraction tax. There is a special formula to calculate the amount of inflows that 
connects collected taxes to the world oil price. Below, Table 6 illustrates the breakdown 
of the Fund’s inflows, accumulated to date. 
Table 6. The Russian Stabilization Fund’s Inflows, by Types of Taxes (in billions 
of rubles) 
 2004 2005 
Oil extraction tax collected by the State Budget 355.1 761.3 
Oil extraction tax transferred to the 
Stabilization Fund 
193.2 525.0 
Oil Export Tax collected by the State Budget 371.3 871.4 
Oil Export Tax transferred to the Stabilization 
Fund 
282.4 705.1 
Total inflows transferred to the Fund 475.6 1230.1 
Urals oil price 34.4 50.6 
 Source: Kudrin, Aleksey 2006. Stabilization Fund: Foreign and Russian Experience (In 
Russian) Voprosy Economiki. #2, February, p. 40. 
 
                                                 
89 The Law of the Russian Federation No. 184-FZ, December 23, 2003, “Amendments to the Russian 
Federation Budget Code with regard to the creation of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation.”  
The Russian Newspaper. December, 27, 2003. http://www.rg.ru/2003/12/27/fond.html.  
90 The federal budget 2006, increased the base oil price to $27 per barrel.   
91 http://ru.wikipedia.org. 
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The ratio between these two types of taxes is approximately 40:60 for the 
extraction tax and the export tax respectively.  Thus, the export tax is the major revenue 
source for the Fund. 
According to law, the Fund’s accumulations can be used for financing a budget 
deficit when oil prices fall below the base level. The accumulations can be used for other 
purposes, as well. The law does not specify what these other purposes may be. The 
spending strategy of the Fund is determined by the federal budget law on an annual basis. 
Thus, it is up to the legislature solely to determine how much to deposit, or to withdraw 
from, the SFRF. 
In 2004 the Fund’s money was frozen. In 2005, 46.5 percent of the Fund’s 
revenues were spent to repay a portion of the Russian foreign debt ahead of schedule and 
two percent was spent to cover State Pension Fund deficits (Table 7). 
Table 7. Inflows and Spending Strategy of the Russian Stabilization Fund in 2004  
and 2005 (in billions of rubles) 
 2004 2005 
Balance at the beginning of the fiscal year 106.3 522.3 
Inflows 415.9 1392.11 
Spending:  
• Repayment of Russian foreign debt; 
• Transfers to the Pension Fund 
 
0 
0 
 
-677.3 
-30.0 
Balance at the end of the fiscal year 522.3 1237.0 
Source: Source: Kudrin, Aleksey 2006. Stabilization Fund: Foreign and Russian 
Experience (In Russian) Voprosy Economiki. #2, February, p. 40. 
The organizational structure of the SFRF is similar to the Norwegian model. The 
revenues of the SFRF are accumulated in an isolated account in the Central Bank of 
Russia. The Russian Ministry of Finance makes strategic investment decisions and 
oversees the Central Bank’s financial operations with the Fund’s money. The Central 
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Bank of Russia is the operational manager.92 The Ministry of Finance provides quarterly 
and annual investment reports to the government. Upon review and revision, the 
government submits these revised reports to the Duma. However, unlike Norway, the law 
and decree that created the Fund do not suggest the creation of any other consulting or 
overseeing agency to assist the ministry in management of the Fund. Thus, the lines of 
accountability appear to be poor (See, Appendix 6). 
According to the decree, the Stabilization Fund’s assets can be placed in a form of 
securities of the governments of such foreign states as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Great 
Britain and the United States. The emitter of securities should have a rating of long-term 
credit status not below a level of “AAA”, as classified by such rating agencies as Fitch-
Ratings and Standard and Poors; nor below a level “Aaa” for the rating agency Moody’s 
Investment Service.93  
The financial effectiveness of the SFRF is somewhat questionable. After two 
years of operation, Russian senators have begun asking questions about the Fund’s 
investment and spending strategies. The discussion became especially hot during the 
period of time when the budget draft of 2006 was being considered.  
The Committee Council of the Russian Federation considered the problem of the 
Fund’s inefficient investment strategies for the 2005 fiscal year.94 The Account Chamber 
calculated that because of inflation the Fund lost approximately 23 billion rubles ($820 
                                                 
92 Decree of the Government of Russian Federation No. 508: “Rules and Procedures to Manage the 
Portfolio of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation” on September, 30, 2004 (Translated from 
Russian). The Russian Newspaper. October 6, 2004.  http://www.rg.ru/2004/10/06/stabilizacionny-
doc.html.  
93 Ibid. 
94 In 2004 all accumulated inflows were frozen. Thus, monies flowing into the Fund remained stagnant and 
unused for financial operations during this period. 
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million) (Kipelman 2005:71). According to the Chamber, the investment strategy was 
weak.95 The Deputy Minister of Finance tried to justify this weakness by arguing that the 
low profitability of bonds in which the Fund invested money, was offset by their high 
reliability. He said that this careful investment strategy coincided with the main purpose 
of the Fund to keep a part of oil revenues out of the Russian economy.96  The Minister of 
Finance tried to defend the poor financial performance of the Fund and then announced 
his estimation of a projected savings on percentage of the Russian foreign debt in 2006 
because of early repayment of a portion of the Russian foreign debt, amounting to 
approximately $1 billion (Kudrin 2006:40). 
Thereafter, the Russian senators expressed even more concern with the Fund’s 
spending strategy. In fact, the senators also conveyed their readiness to prove the 
existence of the Stabilization Fund was illegal.97 On January 18, 2006, the Committee 
Council of the Federation discussed the new budget code prepared by the Ministry of 
Finance. According to the opinion of many senators, the basic financial law of the 
country has so many “blanks” that it could be possible to show and prove that the 
government illegally spends about one-half of the Fund’s revenues.98 This writer believes 
this assertion to be inaccurate.  Rather, the claim appears to arise from citizens’ concerns 
about the Fund’s ineffectiveness, ambiguities, its lack of transparency, together with its 
lack of accountability. 
                                                 
95 There is no public information about any investment portfolio of the Fund. 
96 The State Research Institute of System Analysis of the Account Chamber of the Russian Federation. 
November, 09, 2005. http://www.niisp.ru/News/Events/art58.  
97  “The Stabfund is out of the Law,” The Russian Newspaper. January 19, 2006. 
http://www.rg.ru/2006/01/19/stabfond.html.  
98 Ibid. 
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Clearly, the effectiveness of the SFRF as a fiscal policy institution, to date, is 
mixed. The Fund has had some positive effects in curbing an over-appreciation of the 
ruble, repaying foreign debt and saving money for future generations. However, overall, 
the investment strategy cannot be viewed objectively and pronounced a success.   
It appears that the Russian Fund as a political institution, that should create trust 
between the legislature, other parts of the government and Russian citizens, is not 
succeeding well at this task. In the last months of 2005, tensions between the Duma and 
the administration regarding spending projections for 2006 and the actual expenditures of 
2005 grew to the point of creating near political instability. The broad Russian population 
is not satisfied with the low level of transparency currently being exhibited by the Fund.  
A lack of transparency creates gossip among the people that oil money is being spent on 
personal conveniences by top Russian bureaucrats.  According to a recent opinion poll by 
the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 88 percent of Russian citizens would 
like the government to spend several billions of petrorubles today, thereby avoiding the 
risk that oil prices will drop and budgetary problems appear, because the simple truth is 
that the people do not believe the government is able to manage the oil money in their 
best interests.99 
Why did all this happen with the brand new Russian Stabilization Fund? 
It is obvious that a variety of mistakes were made in designing the Russian Fund: 
major mistakes in predicting oil market dynamics and, consequently, related mistakes in 
setting the threshold and base prices of oil. In addition there was a failure to establish 
                                                 
99 Russia Needs Billions of Petrodollars to Restrain the Galloping Inflation Rate. Pravda.ru, 07/13/2005. 
http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/89/358/15799_petrodollars.html. 
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limits concerning the size of the Fund, together with a failure to account for weaknesses 
in the law or to create automatic correcting mechanisms. 
The Account Chamber has concluded that the major mistake when creating the 
Fund was the lack of proper legislative input. The law that established the Fund in 2003 
was too general and abstract. In fact, the designers of the Fund believed that the threshold 
would provide “a breathing space” for at least 3-4 years until Fund money could be used. 
Their hope was that within this time needed decrees and regulations would have 
sufficiently developed in an addition to the law. Thus, this weakness in the law and the 
corresponding inherent legal weakness in the Fund was a failed calculated gamble 
responsible for the mistakes in predicting the oil market.  
As early as the middle of 2004 it became obvious that the threshold was passed 
and that an amendment to the law with a clear investment strategy needed urgent and 
immediate development.  A later decree, on September 30, 2004 amended the law with 
some articles regarding an investment strategy for the Fund. However, the amendments 
did not provide sufficient substantive details or other enduring guidance. As of this 
writing, an agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank that is 
supposed to determine details of an investment strategy (a calculation of the size of the 
investment portfolio, its currency structure, risk management parameters, and other 
issues) has not yet been created, even though provided for by the State Decree of 
September, 30, 2004.100 
Just as fundamental, an acceptable level of transparency and accountability, with 
an opportunity for public oversight and participation in the decision making of the Fund, 
does not exist. Information concerning the Fund’s operations is difficult to secure for 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
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purposes of analysis. The SFRF does not maintain its own website. It is possible to find 
some eclectic information about the Fund on different governmental websites.101  
However, the information is not systematized. There are no special sections or archives 
collecting legislative actions, press releases or other materials concerning the Fund on 
these websites. Russia does not even list the SFRF as being among its state funds. It 
would appear that either the government is not sure about the status of the Fund or is not 
listing the Fund for the purpose of limiting the Fund’s level of transparency even more. 
Some limited information, such as newspaper and several scholarly articles, about the 
Fund was published in the media, indicating some minimal level of observational 
transparency exists in the Fund’s operations. 
Apart from these political deficiencies, there are concerns about the source of 
revenues for the Fund. A group of Russian geologists suggest that an oil extraction tax 
should not be transferred to the Stabilization Fund because it limits the investment 
capacity of oil companies to develop new, often more expensive, oil fields (Kipelman 
2005: 81).102 They also criticize an increase in the oil export tax (30 percent corresponds 
with an oil price of $20 per barrel and more than 70 percent corresponds with an oil price 
of $60 per barrel).  
Despite the observed weaknesses of the Fund, it appears the government is not 
going to give up on the Fund (as has happened several times in Venezuela). Recently, 
some possible changes in the Fund’s structure were discussed in the corridors of power. 
The government is considering delegating more authority to the Central Bank for 
                                                 
101 http://www.government.ru, http://minfin.rinet.ru/zakoni/362803-3.htm, 
http://www.niisp.ru/News/Events/art58.  
102 Or this tax can be transferred to a kind of a state modernization fund to assist companies in developing 
new oil fields. In this case, the proposed fund should accumulate taxes from an extracting other natural 
resources as gas, gold, diamonds, metals, and others. 
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management of the Fund’s investment portfolio as a professional financial institution. 
Auditing Chamber Chairman Sergey Stepashin is considering auditing the Fund’s 
operations as one of the key aspects of the Chamber’s work. In his speech at the six 
Conference of the Association of Controlling and Auditing Institutions of Russia, Sergey 
Stepashin called cooperation of auditing institutions with law-enforcers “very effective.” 
According to Stepashin, in 2003, after examinations conducted by auditing institutions, 
law-enforcers started 240 investigations of suspected criminal cases. And this appears to 
be just the beginning. “If we want to build an effective democratic state based on the rule 
of law and want to eradicate corruption in Russia, we need thoroughly elaborated laws 
and strict observance of them,” said Stepashin.103 In addition, the government is 
considering the establishment of an institute of external auditor to evaluate the Fund 
based upon world-wide practice. 
 
4.4. Recommendations for Promoting Transparency, Accountability and Public Oversight  
       in Management of the Russian Stabilization Fund 
 
Theoretical framework and factual analysis provided in the first two chapters, 
addressed and proved the hypothesis: that the more transparent, accountable and open for 
public scrutiny any NRF is, the more likely the fund will perform effectively in terms of 
earnings and public spending. This final section of the thesis, addresses the main research 
question: what should be done in Russia to increase fiscal transparency, public 
accountability and participation in managing the Russian Stabilization Fund? 
                                                 
103 “Sergey Stepashin knows the way of eradicating corruption in Russia.” Pravda.Ru. March 17, 2006.  
http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/89/355/12053_corruption.html.  
  - 64 -  
 
 
Despite the skepticism of some international observers concerning the benefits of 
setting up an oil fund in a country with an absence of overall budget discipline,104 the 
SFRF has achieved several positive results mentioned in the immediate previous section. 
Even despite tension between senators and the administration, and given Russian 
citizens’ concerns regarding the Fund’s lack of transparency and accountability, the Fund 
can be seen in a positive light. This does not mean that Russian society will continue to 
tolerate the current situation. 
According to official statistics, substantial oil money remains in the Fund despite 
the pressure of special interests, which become stronger each day. Therefore, it is not too 
late to improve the Fund’s design to guarantee the effective investment strategy, 
transparency and accountability of the Fund. 
Section 3.1, above, provides general guidelines for any NRF to guarantee 
transparency, accountability and public oversight. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 observe the best 
practices of accountability for public scrutiny of the funds. Section 4.3 highlights the 
fragility of the natural resource fund in Russia, given the poor design, the lack of checks 
and balances in its governance, and the weak legislation. Rather then repeating the 
recommendations already made, this section will focus on what precisely the Russian 
Fund should do in the foreseeable future to improve its design and increase its 
transparency and accountability. 
4.4.1. Improving the Overall Design of the Fund 
It is fundamental to first clarify the SFRF’s mission and objectives. The law 
establishing the Fund sets forth that it can be used for the “financing of federal budget 
                                                 
104 Russia’s Growing Dependence on Oil and Its Venture into a Stabilization Fund. Prepared by the Institute 
for the Analysis of Global Security. http://www.iags.org/n0328052.htm.  
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deficits when an actual price falls below the base price, and for other purposes.”105 The 
first objective (addressing budget deficits) is clear while the second (other purposes) is 
not. The second objective should be specified with unmistakable clarity. A more specific 
statement of the Fund’s mission would make it possible to determine what expenditure 
and investments fall within the Fund’s mandate and which fall outside of it. If the 
Russian government and architects of the Fund are not ready to formulate long-term 
objectives, a short-term strategy of five years, for example, could help to create a stable 
environment around the Fund for at least this period. Otherwise, a smoldering situation, 
ripe for social revolution, will surround the reading of the federal budget draft each year.  
A diversified investment strategy must be established for the Fund. The decree 
states that the Stabilization Fund’s assets can be placed only in a certain form of 
securities with governments of several specified foreign states.106 However, the 
experience of other natural resource funds demonstrates that combining stocks and bonds 
makes it possible to increase returns while keeping risk relatively low. It is important to 
develop a long-term strategy for investing in both equity and securities, and to set limits 
to the various asset classes. The investment strategy should set benchmark rates of return, 
and should indicate what portion of the assets, if any, may be given to external managers 
for independent investment. 
It appears that no external managers were allowed to manage the Russian Fund’s 
assets.  The experience of other NRFs teaches that it is wise to delegate a portion of a 
                                                 
105 The Law of the Russian Federation No. 184-FZ on December 23, 2003 “Amendments to the Russian 
Federation Budget Code with regards on the creation of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation.”  
The Russian Newspaper. December, 27, 2003. http://www.rg.ru/2003/12/27/fond.html. 
106 Decree of the Government of Russian Federation No. 508: “Rules and Procedures to Manage the 
Portfolio of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation” on September, 30, 2004 (Translated from 
Russian). The Russian Newspaper. October 6, 2004.  http://www.rg.ru/2004/10/06/stabilizacionny-
doc.html. 
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fund’s principal for management by independent investment agencies. Initially, a portion 
of the principal can be limited and then increased gradually, should success be 
demonstrated. However, these agencies should be chosen through a process of a 
competitive tender. 
It must be clearly understood that it is absolutely mandatory that the Fund act as a 
professional financial investor. The people’s national endowment must not be wasted, 
and most assuredly must not be wasted because of inflation or poor investment 
management by governmental agencies. To strengthen a governmental team of investors, 
an independent investment consulting body could be created. 
These and other new, protective design features for the Fund should be carefully 
defined by law and strongly enforced against violation or circumvention. Currently, the 
SFRF exists only on the basis of two legal acts that provided a skeletal framework for the 
Fund’s establishment. The legal foundation of the Russian Fund must be significantly 
strengthened. 
4.4.2 Improving Accountability and Public Oversight of the Russian Fund 
Until now, there has been neither an internal nor an external auditing policy 
established for the Fund. Therefore, an entire auditing system for controlling financial 
performance must be developed. According to the best international practice, an 
evaluation of a fund’s overall activity can help to guarantee compliance with that fund’s 
goals and objectives. However, an independent, external auditor and evaluator should be 
hired through a competitive process. Audit and evaluation reports must be open in their 
entirety for public scrutiny. 
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Lines of accountability for oversight of the Russian Stabilization Fund must be 
strengthened significantly:  
• An agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank should 
be developed forthwith to set a clear division of responsibilities and a 
sophisticated system of checks and balances between them to ensure 
accountability of their financial operations. 
• An oversight body or council should be created by the legislature with clear 
statements of goals, objectives and responsibilities. This body or council can 
function as a “watchdog,” with the aim of contributing to an informed public 
debate and sound management of the petroleum wealth. It is crucial for the 
success of such a body that representatives from Russian civil society be 
included. The law should stipulate procedures for selecting such 
representatives to guarantee their presence on the body or council.107    
4.4.3 Improving Transparency of the SFRF 
Since there is currently no financial data publicly available concerning the SFRF, 
quarterly and annual reports beginning for the year 2004 and thereafter should 
immediately be made available for public scrutiny and consideration. Ideally, all 
information about the Fund should be considered property of the Russian people and be 
made available on a website, to all media and upon request. 
The best way to make information about the Fund available for the maximum 
number of people in a short period of time in Russia is to create and maintain a Fund 
website.  Initially, special sections, devoted to the Fund, can be designed on websites of 
governmental bodies involved with the Fund’s operations: the Ministry of Finance and 
                                                 
107 Part III of the Guidelines provides other recommendations to design an oversight body 
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the Central Bank. Ideally, a feedback opportunity should be provided so as to provide 
answers to questions posed by the people.108 
Outreach activities by the Fund’s staff, such as press-conferences, briefings, and 
seminars, as well as public hearings on the Fund’s operations, will be highly appreciated 
by Russian citizens and will go a long way towards releasing current tensions.   
                                                 
108 Part 1 of the Guidelines under Section 2.1,  provides other general recommendations on how to increase 
people’s awareness about the Fund  
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Appendix I.  Key Features, Advantages and Disadvantages of Different  
…….Types of NRFs 
 
Type of a 
fund 
Key features Advantages  Disadvantages 
Stabilization 
fund 
9 Purpose to reduce the 
impact of volatile revenue on the 
government and the economy. 
9 The idea is that the fund 
receives money from the budget 
when petroleum revenue is 
particularly strong and pays out to 
the budget when resource revenue is 
weak. 
9 Inflows and outflows are 
typically contingent on whether the 
resource revenue or price is “high” 
or “low,” compared to some 
historical average. 
Stabilization funds aim 
to make budgetary 
spending more stable 
and predictable by 
reducing the uncertainty. 
 
9 Suffer from the 
fungibility problem. 
Government can make 
payments to the fund 
when the resource price 
is high, but may not 
reduce expenditure if 
they borrow elsewhere. 
9 Another 
potential design flaw is 
if their rules of inflows 
are based on rigid price 
thresholds that may 
become inappropriate.  
Saving fund 9 Purpose to build up wealth 
for future generations. 
9 Inflows are typically either 
a fixed share of the resource revenue 
or a fixed nominal contribution from 
the budget. 
9 Outflows are typically 
discretionary transfers to the budget, 
but sometimes are also linked to 
specific situations (recessions). 
Savings funds can 
contribute to long-term 
management of natural 
resource revenues 
This fund is fungible 
too. This mean that 
assets in the savings 
fund do not necessarily 
represent genuine 
savings, since the 
government could be 
borrowing. This can 
lead to inefficient cash 
management. 
Financing 
fund 
• Purpose to overcome the 
design flaw of savings and 
stabilization funds relating to 
fungibility; 
• Act as the government’s 
savings account and can serve as 
both savings and stabilization fund; 
• The budget transfers all 
petroleum revenues to the fund and 
the fund in turn finances any 
remaining budget deficit. Thus the 
net inflow into a financing fund is 
exactly the overall fiscal balance.   
Financing funds 
transparently show not 
only how much of the 
resource revenue the 
government is saving, 
but also what the 
amount saved depends 
on the government’s 
fiscal policy decisions.  
For such a fund to be a 
success, it requires 
decision-making by 
government and 
parliament to be 
informed and long-term. 
The challenge grows in 
tandem with the size of 
the fund. 
Source: Based on Establishing a Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste. Public Consultation 
Discussion Paper. Ministry of Planning and Finance. October2004, p.22. 
www.mopf.gov.tp.  
  - 70 -  
 
 
Appendix 2. Transparency, Accountability and Public Participation Guidelines for  
                      Natural Resource Funds 
 
Part I: Access to Information (Transparency) 
N Generic Transparency Features Fund’s Scores 
1 An annual report published in entirety and is accessible to anyone  
2 Details of revenue in a Fund are accessible to anyone   
3 Details of where and how a Fund is invested are accessible to anyone   
4 Details of expenditure are accessible to anyone  
5 
Contracts between the government and petroleum companies and details of 
any payments transferred from oil companies to the Government or individuals 
or companies are accessible to anyone  
 
6 Audit reports are accessible to anyone under the Law  
7 All of the information described in points 1-5 is available on the internet   
8 All of the information described in points 1-5 is presented on radio and TV, is available in prescribed libraries  
9 All the information described in points 1-5 is provided in several languages in all mediums   
10 All the information is presented in the comprehensible language  
11 A commitment to the principles of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is made in Law   
12 Policies, procedures, practices and mechanisms for managing petroleum revenue are understood by the majority of civil society   
13 There are links from the home page to get any information related to an NRF  
14 Chosen external asset managers  
15 Statement of disclosure policies  
16 Daily Fund position is available through Internet   
17 Possibility of any feedback through the Internet (asking questions, providing comments, internship opportunities, and so on)  
 
Part II: Accountability (Audit Reports) 
N Generic Accountability Features Fund’s Scores 
18 A Fund is audited internally (every 6 months)  
19 An NRF is audited independently and externally   
20 An external, independent auditor is chosen through a process of competitive tender   
21 An external, independent auditor will audit all payments relating to management of the resources   
22 An external, independent auditor will audit the performance of investments   
23 An external, independent auditor will audit the Fund Managers   
24 An external, independent auditor will certify the calculation of the withdrawal guideline   
25 Audits will occur at least annually and be provided in an Annual Report   
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Part III: Public Participation (Oversight Mechanisms and Public Input) 
N Generic Public Participation Features Fund’s Scores 
26 An oversight body is established   
27 An oversight body has power of veto over governmental or parliamentary/legislative decisions related to NRF matters 
 
28 An oversight body can report to Parliament or other governmental entities at any time in relation to any aspect of petroleum revenue management   
29 An oversight body’s responsibilities include input into expenditure decisions   
30 An oversight body is not solely appointed by government   
31 An oversight body is widely representative and includes membership from civil society   
32 An oversight body represents women   
33 Members of the oversight body are remunerated   
34 An oversight body is provided with resources to seek information and advice   
35 An oversight body is provided with resources to seek advice independent of government   
36 An oversight body is provided with an adequate time frame to provide advice   
37 An oversight body’s responsibilities are well defined   
38 The oversight body’s responsibilities include to protect the interests of both current and future generations   
39 Civil society has an opportunity to participate in development of a Fund through an annual forum or public hearings  
 
 
Part IV: Crucial Elements of a Good Design Related to Transparency and Public  
               Participation 
N Generic Good Design Features 
Fund’s 
Scores 
40 A NRF is established as an amendment to the Constitution   
41 All of the features of a NRF are defined by Law   
42 Relevant institutions have the capacity to manage the natural resource  revenue (separation of power)  
43 
A legislative body, a president, a treasury department, a central bank and 
economic development department should have some role in overseeing NRF 
operations, and performance evaluation. 
 
44 A life-span of the Fund is described   
45 A Fund should be professionally managed  
46 A Fund is ‘integrated’ with the budget process   
47 Principles of the Law include protecting the interests of both current and future generations   
48 Rule changes should be extremely cumbersome (a constitutional amendment or parliament/legislative super-majority  
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Appendix 3  
 
Comparison of Six NRFs’ Websites    
 
FUNDS’ SCORES  
Type of information provided Alaska Norway Canada, 
Alberta 
Venezuela Azerbaijan Kazakhstan 
1. Annual reports published in 
entirety 
YES YES YES NO YES NO 
2. Details of revenue: 
• Inflows by itself 
• Breakdown by source 
• Earnings benchmarks 
• Return on portfolio 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YESi 
Partlyii 
 
NO 
NO 
 
YES 
YES 
 
NO 
YES 
 
YES 
Partlyiii 
 
NO 
YES 
3. Details of where and how a 
Fund is invested: 
• Companies/indexes in 
which the fund holds 
assets 
• Market value of holdings 
in each company 
• Methodology of 
investment and risk 
management  
• Chosen external asset 
managers 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 
Partlyiv 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
 
Partlyv 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
4. Details of expenditure: 
• Expenditure by itself 
• Breakdown by type 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
NO 
 
YES 
YES 
 
YES 
YES 
5. Details of any payments 
transferred from oil companies 
to Government or individuals  
NO NO NO NO YES NO 
6. Reports of external auditor 
published in entirety 
YES YES NO NO YESvi NO 
7. All the information 
described in points 1-6 is 
available on  Internet 
NO NO NO NO NO NO 
8. All the information 
described above is presented on 
radio and TV, is available in 
prescribed libraries 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
9. All the information 
described above is provided in 
all official languages in 
Internet 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
10. All the information is 
presented in the 
comprehensible languagevii 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
11. A commitment to the 
principles of the Extractive 
Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) is made in 
Law  
NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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12. Policies, procedures, 
practices and mechanisms for 
managing petroleum revenue  
YES Partlyviii YES Partlyix NO NO 
13. There are links from the 
home page to get any 
information related to an NRF 
YES YES NO NO Partly NO 
14. Chosen external asset 
managers 
YES YES NO NO YES NO 
15. Statement of disclosure 
policies 
YES YES YES NO YES NO 
16. Daily Fund position is 
available through Internet 
YES NO NO NO NO NO  
17. Possibility of any feedback 
(asking questions, providing 
comments and so on) 
YES YESx YESxi NO Partlyxii YESxiii 
Total Score: 19.0 16.5 11.5 4.0 13.5 6.5 
 
The six websites can be found at the following URL’s: 
Alaska: http://www.apfc.org/.  
Norway: http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/p10001682/bn.html 
Canada (Alberta): http://www.finance.gov.ab.ca/business/ahstf/index.html.  
Venezuela: http://www.bcv.org.ve/ifms/ifms.htm.  
Azerbaijan: http://www.oilfund.az.  
Kazakhstan: http://www.nationalfund.kz  
                                                 
i The last inflow information available is for 2002. 
ii The information is not complete and available until 2002. 
iii The information is not complete. The breakdown provided is by type of payment (i.e. VAT, royalty) but 
not by company which made the payment.  
iv It has a breakdown by type of market (US, Canadian, Non-American) and by type of asset, but it does not 
name companies.  
v It has an aggregated breakdown by type of financial institutions, but it does not name them. 
vi However, the last available report is for 2003 fiscal year. 
vii We would prefer not to estimate the level of funds websites comprehensiveness it in this paper. Probably, 
it should be additional criteria than just our personal judgment.  
viii Unlike the resource funds in Alaska, Alberta, and Venezuela, Norway’s SPF does not specify what share 
of oil revenues are to be deposited each year. Deposits are determined annually by the legislature; they 
consist of net oil revenues after the non-oil budget deficit has been covered. 
ix They provide general rules in the Law, but they do not support it by any additional regulations. 
x Anyone can ask a question; however it goes not to fund’s staff directly, but to the Ministry’s of Finance 
web desk.  
xi It goes to the general information service for the Ministry of Finance as with the Norwegian Fund.  
xii They provide the contact information on the website, but it does not say that any questions will be 
answered. 
xiii It also goes to the general information service for the Ministry of Finance. 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
Lines of Accountability in Oversight of Norway’s State Petroleum Fund 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Norges Bank 
Supervisory 
Council 
Appointed by 
parliament to 
oversee SPF 
Auditor 
General 
Conduct annual 
audit and submits to 
the Council 
Advisory 
Council on 
Ethics 
Consult the Ministry 
on ethical issues 
Investment 
Strategy 
Council 
Assist the Ministry 
with investment 
strategy  
Norges Bank (Central Bank) 
 
Risk management/risk control, 
Accounting 
Reporting 
 
Reports to Ministry of Finance 
Manag
ement 
Team 
Petroleum 
Insurance 
Fund 
External Auditor 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Strategic investment decisions 
 
 
Oversees Bank’s management 
of the Fund 
Parliament 
Determines deposits to the Fund 
annually 
General Oversight the SPR 
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Appendix 5 
Lines of Accountability in Oversight the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
External Audit 
President 
 
Controls the SOFAZ, appoints the Executive Director and members of the 
Supervisory Council 
Supervisory Council 
 
• Reviews SOFAZ’s annual 
report and audit’s report, and 
proposed budget for SOFAZ. 
• Reports to the president 
Executive Director of SOFAZ 
 
• Exercises operational management 
• Submit quarterly and annual reports 
• Estimates of operational expenses to the president  
• Cooperates with auditor selected by the president 
 
 Investment Board 
 
Consults the Director with 
investment strategy 
Consists of the executive director 
and senior officials of relevant 
SOFAZ departments  
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 Appendix 6 
 
Lines of Accountability in Oversight of Russian Stabilization Fund 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Auditing 
Chamber  
Conduct annual 
audit and submits to 
the Duma (a project) 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Strategic investment 
decisions 
 
 
Oversees Bank’s 
management of the Fund 
Central Bank of Russian 
Federation 
 
Risk management/risk control, 
Accounting 
Reporting 
 
Reports to the Ministry of Finance 
External Auditor (it does 
not exist yet, but there is a plan 
to create. 
Parliament (Duma) 
Determines spending strategy of 
the Fund as a part of the federal 
budget law 
 
General Oversight of the SPR 
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